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To Air or Not to Err: The Threat of
Conditioned Federal Funds for Indecent
Programming on Public Broadcasting
by
Rocio.DE LOURDES CORDOBA*
"The court jester who mocks the King must choose his words with
great care.'
Recent events have reinforced the truth of this maxim within the
realm of the federal government's funding of the expression of ideas.
While the funding activities of the National Endowment for the Arts
(NEA) have received a great deal of attention, broadcasting also has
become the target of legislation that highlights the federal govern-
ment's morality campaign.
The late 1980s appear to signal the apex of a forceful, yet iron-
ically silent, campaign to remove indecency from the airwaves at any
time, and in any shape or form. Despite an alleged era of broadcast
deregulation begun during the Reagan administration, 2 Congress and
the Federal Communications Commission 3 (FCC) gradually have tight-
ened their grasps on "indecent" broadcasting to the point of com-
pletely banning this constitutionally protected form of speech from the
public airwaves. 4 After almost a decade of limiting its definition of
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1985, University of Southern California. The author
wishes to thank the staff of the General Counsel's Office at National Public Radio for allowing
her to witness the workings of public radio firsthand as a law clerk.
I. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 408 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. See generally Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation,
60 Tax. L. Ray. 207 (1982). Former FCC Chairman Fowler and his assistant Brenner argue
that the licensing scheme creates the perception that broadcasters are community trustees and
that licensing should be eliminated, thereby allowing broadcasters to act like, and be perceived
as, marketplace participants. Id. at 209. The authors further state that "in light of the first
amendment's heavy presumption against content controls the Federal Communication Com-
mission should refrain from insinuating itself into the program decisions made by licensees."
Id. at 210.
3. Congress largely has delegated the regulation of radio and television stations to the
FCC, which grants licenses to operate within this limited spectrum. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
4. See In re Enforcement Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
FCC 90-264, July 12, 1990 [hereinafter 1990 Indecency Prohibitions] (imposing civil and
criminal penalties on whoever broadcasts "obscene, indecent, or profane" language over the
radio); infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
The FCC notes that although "[it is well established that the First Amendment does not
protect obscene speech," the Supreme Court has determined that "[s]exual expression which
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indecency to the use of seven "filthy words" broadcast prior to 10
p.m. and after 6 a.m.,5 in 1987 the FCC announced a change of heart
in three simultaneously released opinions. 6 The new FCC ruling shifted
the legal time to begin broadcasting "indecent material" from ten p.m.
to midnight. 7 Broadcasters, however, complained that the FCC never
fully defined indecency.8 No longer was indecency limited to certain
prohibited words; instead, the FCC had reverted to its former "ge-
neric" definition of indecency. 9
is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment." Id. para. 12 (quoting Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989)). Nevertheless, the FCC
concluded that a congressionally mandated 24-hour prohibition of indecent speech in broad-
casting adheres to the constitutional standard for regulating broadcast indecency articulated
by the Court in Sable because "the compelling government interest in protecting children from
indecent broadcasts would not be promoted effectively by any means more narrowly tailored
than a 24-hour prohibition." Id. para. 2; see also Enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 47
C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1989) (restricting transmission of obscene or indecent language on a 24-
hour basis). But cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1977) (FCC may regulate
patently indecent broadcasts only when exposure of children and unwilling adults is unavoid-
able); see infra Part II.B.
5. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C. Rec. 930, para. 4 (1987) (noting that in
the 10 years following Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726, "[ulnstated, but widely assumed ... was
the belief that only material that closely resembled the George Carlin monologue [of seven
'filthy words']" broadcast prior to 10 p.m. would be indecent under the FCC's indecency
test); see infra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
6. Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C. Rec. 2698 (1987) (KPFK-FM); The Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 2 F.C.C. Rec. 2703 (1987) (KCSB-FM); Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. Rec.
2705 (1987) (WYSP-FM) [hereinafter 1987 Indecency Rulings]; see infra notes 172-173 and
accompanying text.
7. Id.; cf. Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1), 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (court held that the FCC must provide broadcasters with clear notice through prospective
rulemaking of reasonably determined times during which indecency may be aired safely). See
infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
8. Following the 1987 Indecency Rulings a consortium of broadcasters filed a Petition
for Clarification and Reconsideration, claiming the FCC's indecency definition was "uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad" and suggesting revisions. See infra notes 220-226 and
accompanying text.
9. In a Public Notice announced after the 1987 Indecency Rulings, the FCC adopted the
"generic" standard of indecency as: "language or material that depicts or describes in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs." New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 52
Fed. Reg. 16,386 (1987). Furthermore, it specified that such indecency would be actionable if
broadcast "at a time of day when there is a 'reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience."' Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting Pacifica
Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975))). In FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), the
Court noted that while the FCC standard articulated in the 1975 Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d
94 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Pacifica Ruling], "may lead some broadcasters to censor them-
selves," the FCC definition will, at most, "deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive
references to excretory and sexual organs and activities." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743; see also
1990 Indecency Prohibitions, supra note 4, para. 5 n.8 (FCC defines generic standard); In re
Enforcement Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 4 F.C.C. Rec.
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Indecency regulation after 1987 has transcended FCC action. As-
serting that post-midnight indecent programming might blemish public
airwaves during the so-called "safe harbor" period in the wee hours
of the morning, Senator Jesse Helms, a Republican from North Car-
olina, attached to an FCC appropriations bill'0 an amendment man-
dating the FCC to enforce a total prohibition against indecent
broadcasting." "Garbage is garbage, no matter what the time of day
or night may be," he told the Senate. 12 The Senate adopted the pro-
posed bill, which included Senator Helms' amendment, with little dis-
cussion and President Reagan signed it into law October 1, 1988.13
The signal against broadcast indecency became loud and clear in
October 1989, when the FCC announced it was "taking action" on
ninety-five indecency complaints filed and pending against radio and
television stations during the past two years. 4 In December 1989, the
FCC codified the 24-hour ban of indecency as defined by a yet un-
certain standard.' 5
A group of senators immediately supported the FCC's indecency
enforcement actions as an. "appropriate balance between the protec-
tion of the First Amendment rights of free expression and the need
to protect our nation's children from harmful material.' ' 6 Broad-
casters, however, continue to perceive indecency standards as arbitrary
and vague.' 7 They fear the government is"'becoming too concerned"
with program content on radio and television.' 8
8358, para. 5 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry] (FCC describes "'Pacifica'
standard").
10. Departments of Commerce, Justice & State, The Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriation, Fiscal Year of 1989, 134 CONG. REc. S9885, S9912-13 (daily ed. July 26, 1988)'
[hereinafter Helms Amendment I].
11. Helms Amendment I further provided: "By January 31, 1989 the Federal Commu-
nications Commission shall promulgate regulations in accordance with Section 1464, Title 18,
... to enforce the provisions of such Section on a 24 hour per day basis." Id. at S9913.
12. Id. at S9912.
13. Crigler & Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Curious History of the New FCC Broadcast
Indecency Policy, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 329, 354 (1989) (citing Statement on Fiscal Year 1989
Appropriations Bills, Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1248-49 (Oct. 1, 1988)); see infra note 205
and accompanying text.
14. Commission Announces Action on 95 Indecency Complaints, FCC Daily Digest, Oct.
27, 1989.
15. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1989).
16. Haloner, Senators Endorse Sikes' Anti-Indecency Campaign, EracmRomNc MEDIA, Dec.
4, 1989, at 8.
17. See Making the Call on 'Offensive' Language is Murky Ground, Chicago Trib., Dec.
8, 1989, at 1; Debating Indecency: Panel Features Religious Broadcasters and First Amendment
Advocates, BRoADcAsTiNoG, Sept. 18, 1989, at 28 [hereinafter Debating Indecency]. Barry Lynn
of the American Civil Liberties Union claimed that "the fear that is set loose within the
broadcast industry when the FCC comes to town ... may well inhibit more free and open
January 1991]
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One may easily draw a parallel between the new governmental
scrutiny of indecency in publicly aired material and the recent intol-
erance toward obscene depictions in publicly funded art. Both require
striking a balance between the right to freedom of expression and the
federal government's interest in determining what it will or will not
fund. While the anti-indecency debate generally has not received at-
tention outside the broadcasting community, however, the visual arts
controversy, pitting free speech advocates against legislators unwilling
to spend tax dollars on controversial art exhibits, has become in-
creasingly visible.
In June 1989, Congress began to signal its disapproval of certain
federally funded art. 19 Consequently, discontented arts proponents and
civil libertarians began to ask whether first amendment rights are being
sacrificed for federal dollars. 2° Senator Helms's proposed amendment
to a $10.9 billion Interior Department appropriations bill initiated the
debate over federal arts funding.2' The proposed amendment would
restrict National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) grants that "pro-
mote, disseminate or produce ... obscene or indecent materials, in-
cluding but not limited to depictions of sadomasochism, homo-
eroticism, the exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex
acts.' ' Although the House of Representatives defeated the Helms
Amendment by a vote of 264 to 153,23 the Senate approved the amend-
ment by a voice vote. 24 The onslaught of heated debate in both houses
prompted Congress to form a House-Senate task force to determine
whether the amendment's language was consistent with the Supreme
Court's obscenity standards set out in Miller v. California. 2 By Oc-
discussion." Id. Similarly, Lois Schiffer, National Public Radio legal counsel, stated that the
FCC's "fuzzy" indecency standard has left broadcasters in a quandary over what they may
air. Id. She added, "the issue is solved by the Constitution ... which says the 'cure for
speech you don't like is more speech, not censorship."' Id.
18. 1990 Indecency Prohibitions, supra note 4, para. 71 n.94 (citing broadcasters' com-
ments at 23) (broadcasters asserted that a 24-hour indecency ban "places government in the
position of deciding what children should see and hear"); see also Reversing a Dark Trend,
ELEcTcoNc MEDA, Nov. 6, 1989, at 10; Debating Indecency, supra note 17, at 28.
19. 135 CONG. Rzc. S6858 (Daily ed. June 19, 1989). Senator Helms, responding to a
newspaper editorial criticizing "reactionary politicians" for their disapproval of federal funding
of controversial art exhibits, stated: "I've got news ... [aill across America, good decent
taxpaying citizens are up in arms. If that's 'chilling censorship,' there are a lot of folks around
who intend to make the most of it." Id. (statement of Sen. Helms).
20. Arts Groups Gird for Battle in Capital, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1989, at A14, col. 1.
21. 135 CONG. Rac. S8806 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) [hereinafter Helms Amendment II].
22. Id.; see also Congress Passes Bill Curbing Art Financing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1989,
§ 1, at 27, col. 1.
23. 135 CoNG. REc. H5640 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1989).
24. 135 CONG. REc. H6500 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989).
25. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller established the basic guidelines for defining obscenity:
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tober, the conferees reached a compromise and adopted a milder ver-
sion of the original amendment. 26 The final restrictions barred NEA
funding of exhibits containing "obscene material" that "taken as a
whole" lack "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value" as
determined by local community standards. 27 In essence, Congress elim-
inated reference to indecency and adopted the Supreme Court's Miller
standard. 8
(a) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [citations
omitted]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24; see Helms Amendment II, supra note 24, at H6519-26; see also Compromise is
Proposed on Helms Amendment, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1989, at A14, col. 3 (proposition that
House reach compromise between the standards Helms originally proposed, see supra note 22
and accompanying text, and Supreme Court standards by appointing a legislative commission
to review NEA grants while "keeping in mind" the obscenity standards of the Court).
26. Helms Amendment II, supra note 24.
27. In announcing the revised amendment, Representative Regula stated that its "language
came from the Miller case in which the Supreme Court has spoken very clearly. This is tough
language." Id.; see also Congress Passes Bill Curbing Art Financing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1989, § 1, at 27, col. I (reporting that Helms's original strict obscenity standards were rejected
in favor of the more liberal Miller standards).
28. Immediate repercussions were felt in the wake of the conferees' "Helms Amendment."
Although'less stringent than the original proposal, the final anti-obscenity bill placed the
NEA's funding activities under intense political and public scrutiny. It prompted Congress to
form an Independent Commission to monitor the NEA's grant-making process and to determine
within 180 days whether alternative standards should be adopted for federally funded art.
Helms Amendment II, supra note 24, at H6519-26. Under the previous standards, the NEA
was required to fund projects that "in the experts' view foster excellence, are reflective of
exceptional talent and have significant literary, scholarly, cultural or artistic merit." House
Passes Compromise on Federal Arts Financing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4; 1989, at C19, col. 1
(quoting National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, Pub. L. No. 89-209, § 10, 79
Stat. 852 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1988)). The conferees, however,
resolved that "[n]one of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the [NEA] ... may be
used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of the [NEA] ...
may be considered obscene." Helms Amendment II, supra note 24, at H6526. In addition,
the arts institutions that organized the exhibits leading in large part to the arts funding
controversy were placed on a 30-day probation period while Congress reviewed any future
NEA grant proposals. Id. at H6519-26. The monitored art institutions include the Institute
for Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania, which organized a retrospective of
Robert Mapplethorpe photographs described as "homoerotic," and the Southeastern Center
for Contemporary Art in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, which organized an exhibit by
Andres Serrano containing a controversial piece titled "Piss Christ" that depicted a crucifix
in a jar of urine. See House Passes Compromises on Federal Arts Financing, supra at C19,
col. 1. The first visible sign of change at the NEA took place nearly a month after the bill
became law. John Frohnmeyer, the newly appointed NEA chairman, suspended a $10,000
grant to a New York gallery exhibit on AIDS and asked that the NEA not be listed as one
of its sponsors. See The Endowment vs. The Arts: Anger and Concern, N.Y. Times, Nov.
10, 1989, at C33, col. 3. Although claiming that some of the works were in "questionable
taste," Frohnmeyer's primary complaint was against the "political" nature of the show's
January 1991] CONDITIONED FUNDING
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Although broadcasting and the arts are distinct media with diverse
interests, they both share similar first amendment concerns regarding
governmental scrutiny of the content of their works. These concerns
become particularly urgent in the context of federal funding. For ex-
ample, Jesse Helms's 24-hour indecency ban on public broadcasting
was introduced as an amendment to an appropriations bill for funding
federal agencies. 29 Unlike the NEA amendment's restriction of un-
protected speech, however, the broadcasting provisions restricting pro-
tected speech passed quickly and were not greeted with a national
debate.30 Given this antagonism toward broadcasters' freedom of ex-
pression, public radio and television broadcasters, like visual arts prov-
iders, will be vulnerable to conditioned federal funds." When Congress
drafted the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,32 it developed a statutory
framework for appropriating federal funds to noncommercial broad-
casters via the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB).33 If Con-
gress decides to limit its condition of the CPB in an effort to thwart
indecent programming, as it has limited the NEA, public broadcasters
may find themselves without federally appropriated funds if they do
not comply with imposed conditions.
Although public broadcasters and visual artists share first amend-
ment concerns, the degree of governmental intervention varies. For
example, the existence of obscene material would render an artist in-
eligible to receive an NEA grant, but the revised NEA amendment does
not specifically target indecency; nor does it affect non-publicly funded
works. By contrast, Congress has banned broadcast indecency-a pro-
tected form of speech-altogether. Another significant difference lies
in the nature of public broadcasting, which is statutorily protected
from governmental interference under the Public Broadcasting Act.34
While the Act authorizes federal subsidies for public broadcasting, it
catalogue, which contained an essay criticizing political and religious figures, including Senator
Helms. See id. Frohnmeyer stated that the catalog "is a very angry protest against the specific
events and individuals involved over the last eight months in the most recent arts legislation
in Congress. It's very inflammatory." Id. Heavy criticism from the arts community, however,
persuaded Frohnmeyer to reverse his decision and to restore the grant for the exhibit, but not
the catalogue. See National Arts Chief, In a Reversal, Gives Grant to AIDS Show, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 1. As these events illustrate, the NEA funding climate
remains uncertain.
29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part III.
32. Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399
(1988)).
33. Id.
34. See infra Part I.A.
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strictly limits political intervention in program content.3 5 These "in-
sulating" provisions were meant to ensure that public broadcasting
remain free from political pressure and continue to educate and inform
diverse and underrepresented audiences.3 6 Furthermore, because the
Supreme Court has recognized that public broadcasting forms a part
of "the press," it arguably enjoys a heightened degree of protection
from governmental intervention under traditional first amendment
principles.3 7 These two factors should grant public broadcasters a unique
freedom to produce programming unobstructed by federal editorial
influences despite the broadcasters' dependence on federally appro-
priated funds. Conditioned federal funds for'public broadcasting de-
pendent on program content, therefore, potentially may violate the
constitutional and statutory protections afforded broadcasters' speech.
This is especially relevant within the context of indecency. The
24-hour ban ,on broadcast indecency38 could dangerously chill impor-
tant educational and cultural broadcast programs generally, and spe-
cifically those aired on public broadcasting stations. 39 For example,
an AIDS educational segment aimed at teens would render a broad-
caster liable if the broadcast language is deemed indecent. 40 Likewise,
under the current status of indecency law, a documentary on "hate
speech" among public law school campuses utilizing "dirty words"
to relay a realistic message4' could lead the FCC to sanction the public
broadcaster airing this type of program.. Public broadcasters, there-
fore, remain in a precarious position. First, because they continue to
perceive the current indecency definition as vague, broadcasters re-
main unclear as to when fully protected speech ends and actionable
indecency begins. A public broadcasting station, therefore, may choose
to alter its programming to protect itself from an indecency action.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 363, 382 ("[The special place of the
editorial in our First Amendment jurisprudence simply reflects the fact that the press, of which
the broadcasting industry is indisputably a part [citations omitted] carries out a historical, dual
responsibility in our society of reporting information and of bringing critical judgment to bear
on public affairs .... ).
38. See supra note 4.
39. See infra Part III.
40. National Public Radio (NPR) has been recognized for its coverage of the AIDS crisis.
See, e.g., 135 CoNo. REC. S9130 (daily ed. July 31, 1989) (Senator Pell's remark on NPR's
"moving account" of the hospital crisis in New York City and its effect on AIDS care).
41. The advent of the rise of hate crimes, and neo-nazism in the Pacific Northwest, for
example, was recently the subject of an Oregon Theater production covered by NPR. See
Audiences See a Troubled Reflection; At Oregon's Shakespeare Festival, "God's Country"
Focuses on Neo-Nazism Both On and Off Stage, L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1990, at 50 (Sunday
home ed.).
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This practice could have a chilling effect on non-indecent and fully
protected programs that are erroneously deemed to be indecent by a
broadcaster. Furthermore, until the 24-hour ban is reviewed by the
Supreme Court, its constitutionality remains uncertain. Even if the
Court were to strike down the ban as unconstitutional, Congress might
attempt an alternate method of eliminating indecency in public broad-
casting. If Congress observes rampant indecency among public broad-
casting as it did with the arts, legislators may try to curb this practice
by conditioning or completely restricting the appropriation of funds
to the CPB. Conditioned federal subsidies to public broadcasting sta-
tions that refrain from airing indecent programs would be a method
for Congress to regulate indirectly what it could not reach directly.
Several issues arise from the controversies surrounding the federal
anti-indecency campaign as it relates to public broadcasters' funding
vulnerability. First, is a total ban on broadcast indecency an uncon-
stitutional infringement of protected speech? Second, if the ban were
to be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, would public
broadcasting be subject to the same federal scrutiny applied to art by
legislators who wish to guard federal funds? If so, would conditioning
federal funds upon alteration of program content violate public broad-
casters' first amendment right to free speech?
This Note explores these issues by examining actions taken by
Congress, the FCC, and the Supreme Court that have shaped the free-
dom of expression afforded public television and radio.
4 2
Part I discusses the history of public broadcasting and the manner
in which noncommercial broadcasters receive federally appropriated
funds through the CPB. It further examines the legislative intent of
the Public Broadcasting Act's "insulating" provisions to maintain
public broadcasting program content free from governmental control.
Part II examines whether the first amendment guarantee of free speech
is a constitutional "right" under traditional doctrines of federal
broadcast regulation. Furthermore, it analyzes the current status of
federal indecency regulation, and concludes that a 24-hour indecency
ban unconstitutionally chills protected speech. Part III argues that a
legislative scheme conditioning public broadcasters' eligibility for fed-
eral funds on their agreeing not to air any indecent programming would
alter their right to engage in protected speech and therefore result in
an unconstitutional condition. The Note concludes that absent a clear
42. Because the Note takes a federal rather than state or local viewpoint in its analysis,
"public broadcasting" refers to the Public Broadcasting Service and National Public Radio:
national representatives of the majority of noncommercial radio and television stations in the
United States. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
determination by the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality
of a total indecency ban, and until the courts and the FCC provide
broadcasters with narrowly tailored guidelines as to what constitutes
indecency, protected speech-including important educational, cul-
tural, and news programs presented on public broadcasting-will be
chilled from the airwaves.
I. The Evolution of Public Broadcasting
in the United States
Public broadcasting in the United States has evolved from a sam-
pling of educational television and radio stations into a national sys-
tem of federally funded broadcasting entities. This Part describes the
historical and current framework of this system. Section A examines
the legislative history of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 and the
principal provisions regulating today's noncommercial television and
radio broadcasters. Section B illustrates the mechanics of the Public
Broadcasting Act's funding scheme via the CPB. It demonstrates Con-
gress' intent to foster public broadcasting by providing financial as-
sistance that would develop an alternative means of communication
reaching diverse and underrepresented audiences. SectiQn C demon-
strates a clear congressional intent to insulate public broadcasters' ed-
itorial decisions from governmental control.
A. Federal Regulation of Public Broadcasting
(1) Public Broadcasting Prior to 1967
Under the Radio Act of 192741 and the Communications Act of
1934,44 Congress made no special provisions for noncommercial, ed-
ucational broadcasting stations. 4- The increase of radio licensees dur-
ing the 1930s, however, resulted in a decrease of noncommercial stations
because noncommercial stations could not compete effectively with
their commercial counterparts. 46 In an effort to encourage noncom-
mercial broadcasting, the FCC reserved certain frequencies .for edu-
43. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-416, § 602, 44 Stat. 1102.
44. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613
(1988)).
45. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 367 (1984) (before 1939, both
educational and commercial stations were subject to the same licensing requirements).
46. Id.
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cational radio in 1939 and for educational television in 1952.47 At that
time, noncommercial stations depended on state and local govern-
ments, private donations, and foundation grants for their funding. 48
Congress did not provide federal assistance until 1962, when it es-
tablished a matching grants program for educational television through
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to be implemented
with the assistance of the FCC.49 The scheme provided for five-year
matching grants of up to $32 million, with an aim toward constructing
educational television facilities throughout the United States.5 0 These
facilities were to "serve the greatest number of persons ... in as many
areas as possible ... which are adaptable to the broadest educational
uses."-"
By 1967, the number of educational television stations had dou-
bled to 189 and reached 155 million American viewers.5 2 Noncom-
mercial radio, likewise, was expanding." Beginning in 1963, an increase
of two new stations per month resulted in a total of 346 noncom-
mercial stations operating by 1967. 54 This unprecedented growth
47. See id. (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 4.131-4.133 (1939)); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N,
REPORT OF PROPOSED ALLOCATIONS 77 (1945).
48. Id.; see also PUBLIC TE.EVIsIoN: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION: THE REPORT AND REcoM-
MENDATIONS OF TME CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION 33-37 (Bantam ed. 1967)
[hereinafter 1967 CARNEoIE COmm'N REPORT] (concluding that federal financing should augment
financing by state and local governments, private donations, and foundation grants).
49. Educational Television Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-397 (1988) [hereinafter Educational Television Act of 1962].
50. 47 U.S.C. §§ 391-392 (1988).
51. Id. § 392(d)(3). The House Report on the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 expressed
congressional "concern" for the development of "an adequate number of broadcast stations
for educational purposes." H.R. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 [hereinafter 1967
HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1799.
The Report noted, "'[u]nless the process of getting educational television stations on the air
is speeded up, the demand to use these channels for commercial purposes may become
irresistible and thus they will be irretrievably lost to education."' Id. (quoting Educational
Television Act of 1962, supra note 49). This situation prompted the FCC to set aside frequencies
for the exclusive use of noncommercial stations.
Likewise, the Senate Report stated that the FCC had reserved 329 station channels for
educational television by 1966, increasing to 633 set-asides by 1967. S. REP. No. 222, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 [hereinafter 1967 SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADhm4. NEws 1772, 1774. Educational radio stations, however, were not eligible to receive
allocated funds through the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962. Id. at 5. Nevertheless,
346 educational stations were operating by 1967, with construction permits granted to an
additional 18. The Senate noted that "[tihis legislation should encourage that growth." Id.
52. The first noncommercial television broadcast was in 1953; only 90 noncommercial
stations followed through 1962. Id. Congress stated that "these statistics amply demonstrate
the need for and the success of the initial term of the facilities act of 1962." Id. Note,
however, that a total of approximately 745 stations, noncommercial and commercial, were
operating under FCC licenses. See 1967 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 51, at 9.




prompted the Carnegie Corporation to sponsor a study by the Car-
negie Commission s5 on the status of public broadcasting in 1967 and
to suggest congressional action.m The Carnegie Commission found
that although educational broadcasting was expanding, it was seriously
underfinanced.5 7 It recommended that the federal government estab-
lish a nonprofit, nongovernmental "Corporation for Public Televi-
sion" to provide financial support for noncommercial broadcasting.
58
The funding was to aid program production, distribution to local sta-
tions, and establishment of satellite interconnections.59
(2) The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967
Pleased with the Carnegie Commission's report, President John-
son recommended that Congress act upon the Commission's propos-
alsA0 During the congressional hearings, the Carnegie report received
widespread approval and became the framework for the Public Broad-
casting Act of 1967.61 The House of Representatives heartily supported
the appropriation of federal funds for public broadcasting, noting:
55. The Carnegie Commission was formed in 1964 to "conduct a broadly conceived study
of noncommercial television ... [and to] recommend lines along which noncommercial
television stations might most usefully develop during the years ahead." 1967 C~Aumom COmm'N
REPoRT, supra note 48, at vii. President Johnson endorsed the Commission's proposed study,
noting: "From our beginnings as a nation we have recognized that our security depends upon
the enlightenment of our people; that our freedom depends on the communication of many
ideas through many channels." Id. at vii.
56. See id. In its summary, the Commission stated that it had
reached the conclusion that a well-financed and well-directed educational television
system, substantially larger and far more pervasive and effective than that which
now exists in the United States, must be brought into being if the full needs of the
American public are to be served. This is the central conclusion of the Commission
and all of its recommendations are designed accordingly.
Id. at 3. Among its proposals were: "Immediate Action to Extend and Strengthen Educational
Television," id. at 4; "A New Institution for Public Television," id. at 5; "Enlarged Federal
Support for Public Television," id. at 8; and "Continuing Study to Improve Instructional
Television," id. at 9. See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 368 (1984)
(noting that the Carnegie Report provided the impetus for expanded federal involvement in
educational television).
57. See generally 1967 C~ArEwom CoO'N REPoRT, supra note 48.
58. See id. at 36-41.
59. See id. Section 397(3) of the Public Broadcasting Act defines "interconnection" as
"the use of microwave equipment, boosters, translators, repeaters, communication space
satellites, or other apparatus or equipment for the transmission and distribution of television
or radio programs to public telecommunications entities." 47 U.S.C. § 397(3) (1990).
60. 1967 SmATE REPORT, supra note 51, at 3. See also 1967 HousE REPORT, supra note
51, at 10, 24.
61. Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399
(1988)).
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IT]he rewards which are reasonably to be expected from this seed
program cannot be measured in money alone. Who can estimate the
value to a democracy of a citizenry that is kept fully and fairly in-
formed as to the important issues of our times and whose children
have access to programs which make learning a pleasure?
The program support provided by ... the bill will, among other
things, enable the noncommercial educational broadcast stations to
provide supplementary analysis of the meaning of events already cov-
ered by commercial newscasters.
62
On November 7, 1967, the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 be-
came law. 63 Today, it structures public television and radio, providing
funding mechanisms and insulating safeguards that protect public
broadcasting from federal government intrusion.
64
The Act outlines the establishment, mandate, and organization
of the CPB, created to "facilitate the development of public tele-
communications and to afford maximum protection from extraneous
interference and control."65 The CPB is not an "agency or establish-
ment of the federal government,""6 must remain "nonprofit and non-
political, "67 and is authorized to obtain grants from federal, state, and
public agencies that will enable it to carry out its stated purposes."
During the adoption of the Public Broadcasting Act, Congress noted
that it is in the public interest to encourage development of public
broadcasting facilities and programming that is "primarily designed
for educational or cultural purposes and not primarily for amusement
or entertainment purposes." 69 In essence, Congress envisioned public
62. 1967 HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 10.
63. Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 367 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399
(1988)).
64. Id.; see infra Part II.
65. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(8).
66. Id. § 396(b).
67. Id. § 396(f). Section 396(f) provides:
(1) The Corporation shall have no power to issue any shares of stock, or to declare
or pay any dividends.
(2) No part of the income or assets of the Corporation shall inure to the benefit of
any director, officer, employee, or any other individual except as salary or reasonable
compensation for services.
(3) The Corporation may not contribute to or otherwise support any political party
or candidate for elective public office.
68. Id. § 396(g)(2)(A).
69. See 1967 HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 16. In addressing program content, the
House Report stated:
Notwithstanding the difficulties of defining entertainment, the committee deems such
a provision advisable in order to preclude the Corporation from granting funds for
programs which are designed primarily to amuse and for no other purpose. Education
is often entertaining as it is enlightening; indeed it is often more palatable if it is.
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television and radio programming as filling a gap left by commercial
broadcasting.7" Unlike the bulk of entertainment-oriented commercial
programming, public broadcasting should inform, educate, and take
"creative risks [that] . .. address[ the needs of unserved and un-
derserved audiences."
'7'
Congress created the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) in 1969
to carry out "interconnection facilities suitable for distribution and
transmission" of public television to local stations.7 Within a year,
Congress established National Public Radio (NPR) pursuant to the
Public Broadcasting Act's mandate that a "substantial amount" of
CPB funding be made available to noncommercial radio.7 3 Orgahized
as a private, nonprofit corporation, NPR was to perform a service
analogous to PBS for public radio stations, while retaining greater
flexibility than PBS for national program production. 74
For example, Shakespeare, Toscanini, Gilbert and Sullivan, and Will Rogers all have
been great teachers as well as absorbing entertainers, and their works would, of
course, not be excluded by this definition. In short, [the Act] is not intended to
inhibit programs which coat the philosophic pill with innocent merriment.
Id.
70. Id. at 16-17. But cf. 1967 SEATE REPoRT, supra note 51, at 6 (reiterating that
commercial broadcasters also have a duty to operate in the public interest).
71. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1), (6) (1988); see also 1967 CARM' m CoMM'N REPORT, supra
note 48, at 1 (distinguishing commercial television, which "seeks to capture the large audience
... [and] relies mainly upon the desire to relax and to be entertained," from public television,
which "includes all that is of human interest and importance which is not at the moment
appropriate or available for support by advertising"; also noting that public television programs
"do not, and are not intended to, have the mass appeal of commercial TV shows. Public
television was conceived as an alternative to commercial television, and its legislative mandate
to achieve excellence in programming [citation omitted] has been invoked to push it away
from entertainment programs that edge close to the commercial [citation omitted]"); Note,
Editorial Discretion of State Public Broadcasting Licensees, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1161, 1165
(1982) (authored by Susan D. Charles) (same observation).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (g)(2)(E) (1988); 1967 Housa REPORT, supra note 51, at 18; cf. 1967
CAREaiE Comm'N REPORT, supra note 48, at 45 (emphasizing the need for a network of
"vigorous and independent local stations"). Congress emphasized that public television stations
must primarily serve their local communities by producing programs on a local rather than
national level.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 393(c) (1988); see also Note, supra note 71, at 1167 nn.38-39 ('Public
radio' includes only those stations eligible for CPB funding ... [and] considered as a whole
provides diverse high-quality program alternatives to commercial radio.").
74. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 369 n.5 (1984). NPR was
"created ... and charged ... with the responsibility for the production and national
distribution of high quality radio programs." National Public Radio: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1984) (statement of CPB). Furthermore, NPR was founded to
provide certain services that the CPB could not offer directly under provisions of the Act.
NPR "would produce and deliver programs to broadcast stations, protected by the First
Amendment freedom of the press, and would also represent its member stations' institutional
interests. These were compelling reasons for the CPB to give NPR flexibility and to recognize
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B. Federally Appropriated Funds Under the Public Broadcasting
Act
Federal funding under the Public Broadcasting Act takes several
forms. Public broadcasting facilities receive yearly appropriations for
planning and construction through grants from the Secretary of Com-
merce.75 After consulting with the CPB and other public telecom-
munications entities, the Secretary establishes the appropriate criteria
for grant approval.7 6 Generally, an applicant must be either: a non-
commercial telecommunications entity; a nonprofit foundation, cor-
poration, institution, or association organized primarily for educational
purposes; or a state or local government agency or division.7 7 The ap-
plicant's primary purpose must be to operate public telecommuni-
cations facilities and further, the applicant must provide assurances
that it will make "the most efficient use" of federal grants .78
The CPB also is authorized to obtain grants from or contract with
individuals, private and governmental agencies, organizations and in-
stitutions, or make grants to public telecommunications entities, to
assist them in providing programs of "high quality, diversity, crea-
tivity, excellence and innovation. ' 79
The United States Treasury has established a Public Broadcasting
Fund, to be administered by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Fund
receives appropriations equal to a percentage of the total amount of
non-federal financial support received by public broadcasting entities
during each fiscal year.80 These funds are used first by the CPB for
its corporate identity, independence, and control by member stations." Id. at 243.
For additional sources and commentary on the history of public broadcasting, see Canby,
The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public Broadcasting, 52 TEx.
L. REv. 1123, 1149-65 (1974); Note, supra note 71, at 1162-67; Note, FCC v. League of
Women Voters: Conditions on Federal Funding that Inhibit Speech and Subject Matter
Restrictions on Speech, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 453 (1986) (authored by Benjamin Marcus); Note,
The Supreme Court Strikes Down the Public Broadcasting Editorial Ban: FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 12 PEPPERDwE L. REV. 699 (1985) (authored by Michael Gradisher); Comment,
FCC v. League of Women Voters: Freedom of Public Broadcasters to Editorialize, 39 U.
MAMI L. REv. 573 (1985) (authored by Kathy Gregolat); Comment, The Death of a Princess
Cases: Television Programming by State-Owned Public Broadcasters and Viewers' First Amend-
ment Rights, 36 U. MIkw L. REv. 779 (1982) (authored by Jonathan Goodman); Note, Freeing
Public Broadcasting from Unconstitutional Restraints, 89 YALE L.J. 719 (1980).
75. 47 U.S.C. § 392(a), (b) (1988).
76. Id. §§ 391-394.
77. Id. § 392(a).
78. Id. § 392(a)(6).
79. Id. § 396(g)(1)(A).
80. See id. § 396(k)(1)(A)-(C) (Congress has authorized that 4007o be appropriated to the
Fund through 1993).
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administrative expenses; the remainder goes to public television and
public radio in proportion to their expenses. 8'
The Public Broadcasting Act clearly demonstrates Congress' in-
tent to nurture an alternative means of public communication both
locally and nationwide. 82 As the Act's history indicates, the federal
government recognized the need to provide financial assistance for the
development of noncommercial television and radio. Congress' com-
prehensive, long-term appropriations scheme undoubtedly provides a
consistent source of federal funding for public broadcasters. Whether
this aid comes with strings attached or could have strings attached in
the future without violating the Constitution or congressional intent,
however, remains an unanswered question.
C. Public Broadcasting and the CPB: "Insulation vs. Dependence"
This section discusses the Public Broadcasting Act's express stat-
utory safeguards against governmental interference with program con-
tent. Known as the "insulating provisions," these features of the Act
distance congressional appropriations to the CPB from public broad-
casters' program production and distribution.
The Public Broadcasting Act's legislative history reveals a con-
gressional objective to insulate public television and radio from federal
government control. In his message to Congress prior to the enactment
of the Public Broadcasting Act, President Johnson said, "Noncom-
mercial television and radio in America, even though supported by
Federal funds, must be absolutely free from any Federal Governmental
interference over programming. '8 3 The Senate Report further em-
phasized the need for noncommercial stations to retain editorial con-
trol. Likewise, the House Report stressed the need for adopting a
81. Id. § 396(k)(3)(A).
82. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
83. 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 51, at 4.
84. It is clear ... that the programs presented need to be of the highest attainable
quality if educational broadcasting stations are to make optimum use of the scarce
channels they occupy and the facilities with which they have been provided. There
is general agreement that for the time being, Federal assistance is required to provide
the resources necessary for quality programs. It is also recognized that this assistance
should in no way involve the Government in programming or program judgments.
An independent entity supported by Federal funds is required to provide programs
free of political pressures. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a nonprofit
private corporation ... provides such an entity.
We wish to state in the strongest terms possible that it is our intention that local
stations be absolutely free to determine for themselves what they should and should
not broadcast.
Id. at 4, 11.
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mechanism that would provide a source of funds for the development
of public broadcasting without controlling the "final product.
' 85
To allay its fear that public broadcasting would become a prop-
aganda vehicle for the federal government, Congress included in the
Public Broadcasting Act specific provisions designed to preserve li-
censees' "tradition of autonomy and community orientation" while
providing them with the necessary funding.8 Congress carefully drafted
the Act to ensure that the CPB would not operate the public broad-
casting networks in the same way that the commercial television and
radio networks operate in order to keep the CPB even further from
the station's editorial function.87 Congress noted that prohibiting the
CPB from owning or operating noncommercial broadcasting stations
or producing programs for public distribution would serve to steer
public broadcasting stations that receive grants from the CPB away
from economic competition with the commercial networks.8
The CPB's corporate structure further demonstrates Congress'
intent to maintain the CPB as a politically neutral entity. The CPB
board consists of ten directors who may serve a maximum of two five-
year terms and are appointed by the President with the consent of the
Senate.89 No more than six directors may belong to the same political
party.90 They are to comprise "eminent" members involved in edu-
cation, cultural and civic affairs, the arts, radio, and television, and
"are to be selected so as to provide as nearly as practicable a broad
representation of various regions of the country, various professions
and occupations, and various kinds of talents and experiences." 91 Con-
gress stressed that the CPB is "expressly prohibited" from engaging
85. 1967 HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 15. Conveying this consensus, the House
Report stated:
Every witness who discussed the operation of the Corporation agreed that funds
for programs should not be provided directly by the Federal Government. It was
generally agreed that a nonprofit Corporation, directed by a Board of Directors,
none of whom will be Government employees, will provide the most effective
insulation from Government control or influence over the expenditure of funds.
Id.
86. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 386 (1984); see also infra notes
95-97 and accompanying text; 1967 HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 16.
87. In enacting 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(3), Congress assumed that the CPB may not have "a
staff of producers, commentators, announcers, and others directly associated with program
production; a system of fixed schedule broadcasting; ownership or operative authority over
program production equipment, studios, or interconnection facilities; or station affiliates."
1967 House REPORT, supra note 51, at 19.
88. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(3)(B) (1988).
89. Id. § 396(c)(1), (2), (5).
90. Id. § 396(c)(1).
91. 1967 HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 15.
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in any political activities, 92 including "applying political tests in any
personnel actions or endorsing political candidates." 93 The CPB board's
role must remain "solely advisory in nature": without exception it
may not control the daily management or operation of any station.9
In addition to designing an internally politically neutral CPB man-
agement framework, the Public Broadcasting Act prohibits any federal
department, agency, officer, or employee from interfering with the
operation of either the CPB or any public broadcasting station.95 In-
terference with the "content or distribution" of public telecommun-
ications programs or services is specifically prohibited.9 Congress
expressed its hope that eventually "the people of the United States,"
rather than the federal government, would provide the major source
of funding for public broadcasting.97
The insulating provisions and their corresponding legislative his-
tory signify Congress' intent to shield public television and radio from
governmental interference. Appropriating federal funds to public
broadcasting, therefore, does not give Congress editorial control over
program content under the Act. Nevertheless, the current legislative
scheme under the Public, Broadcasting Act places public broadcasting
in the paradoxical position of needing to rely on federal funds while
desiring to remain editorially independent, at least theoretically. The
issue then arises whether these two forces may remain in balance. In
order to assess this question, the next Part will address the issue of
editorial discretion within the context of federal broadcast regulation
over indecency. It will consider whether the first amendment right to
free speech applies to broadcasters generally, and whether this right
extends to the broadcast of indecent material.
H. Do Broadcasters Effectively Enjoy Free Speech as a
Constitutional "Right"?
This Part examines the extent of broadcasters' right to protected
speech. It provides a general overview of the justifications for federal
broadcast regulation and demonstrates varying degrees of first amend-
ment protection granted to broadcasters by the Supreme Court, Con-
gress, and the FCC.
92. Id. at 19.
93. 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 51, at 7.
94. 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(8)(C) (1988).
95. Id. § 398(a) (1988).
96. Id. § 398(c).
97. See 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 51, at 8.
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A. Traditional Doctrines Within Federal Broadcasting Regulation
Although the broadcast and print media both are members of the
"press," the Supreme Court has treated them disparately. 9 Unlike
newspapers and magazines, radio and television broadcasters are reg-
ulated by Congress and the FCC. This section examines underlying
rationales utilized by the Court in upholding broadcasting regulation.
(1) The Broadcast Spectrum: A "Scarce Resource"
Courts historically have utilized the "scarcity doctrine" as a means
to justify Congress' power to regulate broadcasting." The broadcast
media is subject to the "inherent physical limitation" of broadcast
frequencies, which are a "scarce resource"; not all applicants, there-
fore, may obtain broadcast licenses.l°° In Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC10 1 for example, the Court distinguished broadcasters' peculiar
first amendment position from that of the print media by pointing to
the scarcity rationale:
[I]t is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write,
or publish. If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only
10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same "right"
to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by
radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from
the airwaves. It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at
protecting and furthering communications, prevented the Govern-
ment from making radio communication possible by requiring li-
98. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 363, 376 (1984); Columbia Broad-
casting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
99. See generally Ferris & Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears: Broadcast Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 299, 308 (1989) (discussing the
Court's differing approaches toward different forms of media when affording constitutional
protections); Dyk, Full First Amendment Freedom for Broadcasters: The Industry as Eliza on
the Ice and Congress as the Friendly Overseer, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 299 (1988). Mr. Dyk
provides the following commentary regarding the stated versus actual effect of the first
amendment:
The guiding principle of the First Amendment could not have been clearer. Its
purpose was to protect the press from the government. It was not designed to protect
the government from the press or to authorize government regulation of the press
under the guise of protecting first amendment values. This principle applies at all
times to all media. However, the courts have yet to recognize this obvious truth.
Id. at 300.
100. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 101 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388);
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 375.
101. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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censes to broadcast by and limiting the number of licenses so as not
to overcrowd the spectrum.1 2
Despite what appears to be an inherent spectrum limitation, the
scarcity doctrine increasingly has been criticized. The doctrine's critics
primarily emphasize that although demand for new stations far ex-
ceeds the supply of frequencies, modem communications technologies
make the doctrine obsolete. 1 3 As early as 1973, the Court in Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee rec-
ognized that the rapidly evolving electronic technology complicates
broadcast regulation. It noted that "solutions adequate a decade ago
are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be
outmoded [ten] years hence."' 1 4 The availability of alternative com-
munications systems such as cable television, multichannel multipoint
distribution service, satellite master antenna systems, and home vid-
eocassette recorders not only increases broadcasters' competition in
the marketplace, but also serves to dilute scarcity as a justification for
broadcast regulation.0 5 Former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler has chal-
lenged the scarcity doctrine as a false and artificial justification for
broadcast media regulation.'16 Likewise, Professor Pool asserts that
spectrum space could have been allocated according to market forces
rather than government intervention because spectrum the shortage is
a man-made problem, not a technical one.'07 He suggests that even
during the time of Red Lion it was technically possible to provide the
cable television channels for which consumers Would be willing to pay. 18
(2) Broadcasters as Public Trustees
Because the scarcity doctrine limits the number of licenses, Con-
gress has sought to ensure through the FCC that only applicants acting
in the "public interest, convenience and necessity" are granted a li-
cense to broadcast. ,09 The Court in Red Lion recognized broadcasters'
role as the trustees of the public's first amendment rights:
[Tihe people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio
and their collective right to have the medium function consistently
102. Id. at 388-89. Likewise, the Court in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. recognized that the
broadcast milia poses "unique and special problems not present in the traditional free speech
case." 412 U.S. at 101 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388).
103. Ferris & Leahy, supra note 99, at 314.
104. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 102.
105. See Ferris & Leahy, supra note 99, at 314.
106. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 2, at 221-26.
107. I. PooL, Tzcmcooamm oF FRExnom 138 (1983).
108. Id. at 142.
109. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
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with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount." 0
The Court further held that because the public has a right to have
access to "social, political, aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and ex-
periences," neither Congress nor the FCC may constitutionally abridge
that right."' In resolving any first amendment issue, the interest of
the public is the Court's foremost concern." 2 The first amendment
must inform and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises
its regulatory power over broadcasting because, unlike common car-
riers and other federally regulated entities, "broadcasters are entitled
to exercise 'the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public
[duties].'"'' 3
(3) Public Broadcasters' Procedural Limits
Although unlike the print media the broadcast media is subject
to federal regulation, it nevertheless retains a high degree of first
amendment protection in its furtherance of serving the public interest.
The first amendment rights of noncommercial broadcast licensees,
however, are more restricted than those of their commercial coun-
terparts. For example, public broadcasting stations may not "make
[their] facilities available to any person for the broadcasting of any
advertisement," 4 express the views of any person regarding matters of
public concern, or support political candidates.""' 5 Furthermore, the
FCC has full authority to regulate the use of business or institutional
logograms"6 in public broadcast announcements."
7
Recognizing public broadcasters' need to diversify funding sources,
however, the FCC in recent years has relaxed original fundraising res-
110. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
111. Id.
112. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973);
cf. Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent (Book Review), 93 YALE
L.J. 581, 598 (1984) (stating that the market is really the rationing force as those with different
degrees of wealth have different degrees of access to the media of communication).
113. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 453 U.S. at 395).
114. 47 U.S.C. § 399b(b)(2) (1988).
115. Id. § 399b(a)(2), (3).
116. A business or institutional logogram is defined as "any aural or visual letters or
words, or any symbol or sign, which is used for the exclusive purpose of identifying any
corporation, company, or other organization, and which is not used for the purpose of
promoting the products, services, or facilities of such corporation, company, or other organ-
ization." Id. § 399a(a).
117. See id. § 399a(b).
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trictions. In a 1981 Second Report and Order, the FCC stated that
acknowledgment of corporate grants and gifts may be "proper and
possibly necessary to assure the continuation of such funding.""1 " It
further found that "promotion of goods and services without con-
sideration can in some instances further the public interest."119 Nev-
ertheless, the FCC reiterated that public broadcasters must continue
to maintain their essential noncommercial character as provided by the
Public Broadcasting Act.'20
In addition to relaxing fundraising regulations, the FCC's Second
Report and Order recognized the need to uphold public broadcasters'
broad editorial freedom. To this end, the FCC supported a trend away
from federal funding or any other concentrated mode of contribu-
tion.'2 ' Instead, it suggested that public broadcasting entities diversify
their funding sources to avoid financial dependence upon any one dis-
tributor and the resulting vulnerability.12 One such vulnerability is the
dependence on federally appropriated funds. As this Note discusses
later in more detail, public broadcasters' reliance on federally appro-
priated funds potentially may lead to changes in program content under
a statutory scheme that conditions such funds.13
B. Is Indecent Speech on the Airwaves Like a "Pig in the Parlor"?
While the Court has recognized broadcasters' freedom to broad-
cast issues of public concern absent a compelling governmental interest
to limit such freedom, it has not extended comparable first amendment
protection to broadcast indecency.'2 Although recognizing that in-
decent speech is protected by the first amendment, the Court has bal-
anced this against the effect 'that the prevalence of indecent broadcasting
programs would have on unsupervised children in the listening au-
dience. 2- The uncertain standards for regulation of indecent broadcast
speech have led to an ongoing controversy between broadcasters and
118. Second Report and Order, 86 F.C.C. 2d 141, para. 3 (1981).
119. Id. para. 4.
120. See id. para. 3.
121. See id. at 164.
122. Id.
123. See infra Part III.
124. See infra notes 148-166 and accompanying text.
125. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989) (noting that while
indecency retains first amendment protection, "there is a compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors"); Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726,
749 (1977) (Although not entirely outside first amendment protection, patently offensive,
indecent material broadcast on radio may be regulated in furtherance of "government's interest
in the 'well being of its youth."' (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
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the FCC. 126 At issue are contradictory federal statutes that both pro-
hibit program censorship and penalize broadcasts of indecent speech.
Section 326 of the Communications Act, for example, prohibits the
FCC from censoring radio programming if that censorship would in-
terfere with broadcasters' right to free speech. 27 Nevertheless, section
1464 of the United States Criminal Code imposes civil and criminal
penalties on whoever broadcasts any "obscene, indecent, or profane"
language over the radio. 28 Furthermore, if a broadcaster violates sec-
tion 1464, section 312 of the Communications Act empowers the FCC
to impose civil sanctions including warnings, fines, and in extreme
cases the revocation of broadcasting licenses.129 Because the definition
of indecency has evolved over the past decade to a current standard
that broadcasters perceive as vague, the possibility of invoking section
1464 has become a difficult threat for broadcasters to assess. As a
result, broadcasters may choose to refrain from airing programs that
may be held to be indecent but, in fact, contain fully protected speech.
This chilling effect could amount to the type of "censorship" that
section 326 was aimed at protecting. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's
interpretations in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation'30 and Sable Com-
munications v. FCC,'3 ' holding that "indecent" speech as distin-
guished from obscenity retains first amendment protection, is still
controlling precedent.
(1) Broadcast Indecency Pre-1987: Pacifica and Seven "Filthy" Words
A listener complaint prompted the FCC to examine a 1973 broad-
cast of comedian George Carlin's twelve-minute monologue entitled
"Filthy Words" to determine whether the FCC would impose sanc-
tions based on section 1464 of the United States Criminal Code. 32 In
its Memorandum Opinion and Order, issued in 1975, the FCC inter-
preted section 1464 as proscribing "indecent" language, defined as
126. See infra notes 138-229 and accompanying text.
127. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by
the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of
radio communication.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
129. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (1988).
130. 438 U.S. 726 (1977).
131. 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
132. 1975 Pacifica Ruling, supra note 9, at 95; see supra note 128 and accompanying text
(discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1464).
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language that "describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is
a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." ' This broad
definition has become known as the FCC's "generic" standard of in-
decency. 134
In developing a rationale for indecency regulation, the FCC
adopted a nuisance theory, thereby "channelling behavior" to certain
times of the day rather than prohibiting it altogether. 35 Under this
rationale, the FCC suggested that if an otherwise offensive broadcast
had "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value" and was
preceded by warnings, it might be indecent only if broadcast when
children were likely to be in the audience. 36 Because the offensive words
in the Carlin monologue were broadcast in a repetitive manner during
the early afternoon, the FCC found the broadcast indecent and thus
prohibited by section 1464.'
37
Responding to a petition for clarification, the FCC in 1976 issued
another Memorandum Opinion and Order in which it attempted to
explain its nuisance theory announced in the 1975 Pacifica ruling. 38
The FCC stated that it "never intended to place an absolute prohi-
bition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought
to channel it to times of day when children most likely would not be
exposed to it."'' 3 The FCC refrained from commenting on hypo-
thetical situations proposed by the petitioners, emphasizing that its
"declaratory order was issued in a specific factual context."'14 Nev-
ertheless, it noted that in some instances, such as a live news coverage
in which there is no opportunity for prebroadcast editing, it would
be ."inequitable ... to hold a licensee responsible for indecent lan-
guage.'
41
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit struck down the FCC's 1975 Pacifica ruling based upon find-
ings of prohibited censorship and overbreadth 42 Applying the Su-




137. Id. at 99.
138. In re a "Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration" of a Citizen's Complaint
Against Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI (FM), New York, NY, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 893.
141. Id. at 893 n.1.
142. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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preme Court's obscenity standard adopted in Miller v. California,43
the court found that although the Carlin monologue may be "crude
and vulgar by most standards it is not obscene."' 144 The court added
that the FCC ruling was overbroad because proscribing the specific
words used in the Carlin broadcast would render many accepted his-
torical and literary works indecent. 145 Moreover, because the FCC failed
to define "children," the court held that the FCC standard failed for
vagueness.46 The court concluded: "To whatever extent we err, or the
[FCC] errs in balancing its duties, it must be in favor of preserving
the values of free expression and freedom from governmental inter-
ference in matters of taste."' 47 The court thus agreed with the broad-
casters' vagueness challenge of the FCC's indecency standard. The
District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation, however, soon was over-
ruled.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,148 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the former FCC indecency restrictions announced in the 1975
Pacifica ruling. The Court stated that although "[the] prohibition
against censorship [under section 326] unequivocally denies the Com-
mission any power to edit proposed broadcasts in advance and to ex-
cise material considered inappropriate for the airwaves,' 49 the FCC
may regulate broadcasts already aired. 50 The Court determined that
the legislative history of the Communications Act clearly indicates that
Congress did not intend to limit the FCC's power to regulate indecent
language in broadcasting. 151 The Court concluded that section 326 fully
authorizes the FCC to sanction indecent broadcasting.
5 2
Having recognized the FCC's regulatory power, the Court then
attempted to define indecency under section 1464. It noted that be-
cause the statute is written in the "disjunctive .. .each [word] has
a separate meaning."' 53 Regarding Pacifica's assertion that the FCC
standard probably would lead to self-censorship, the Court ration-
alized that the standard "will deter only the broadcasting of patently
143. 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see supra note 25.
144. Pacifica Found., 556 F.2d at 16.
145. Id. at 17 n.19 ("clearly every use of the seven words cannot be deemed offensive,
even as to minors").
146. Id.
147. Id. at 18.
148. 438 U.S. 726 (1977).
149. Id. at 735.
150. Id. at 735-38.
151. Id. at 737.
152. Id. at 738.
153. Id. at 739-40.
[Vol. 42
CONDITIONED FUNDING
offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities." '"- 4
It noted that regulation of indecent language largely will affect "the
form, rather than the content, of serious communication."" 5 The Court
rejected Pacifica's claim that the broadcast was not indecent solely
because it did not contain "prurient appeal," stating that "the normal
definition of 'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with ac-
cepted standards of morality. 11 56 The Court also rejected Pacifica's
assertion that the FCC's interpretation of section 1464 is overbroad,
'emphasizing the fact that indecency regulation is "largely a function
of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract."'
57
Although upholding a limited regulation "channeling" indecent
speech to appropriate contexts, the Court nevertheless afforded in-
decency more first amendment protection than obscenity, which has
no first amendment protection.' 8 Relying on its previous ruling in
Miller v. California, the Court recognized that obscene speech differs
from indecent speech because obscene speech is considered to be of-
fensive to contemporary moral standards. 59 Noting that the first
amendment is meant to allow a free exchange within the "marketplace
of ideas," the Court stated that "the fact that society may find speech
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is
the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is reason
for according it additional constitutional protection."160 Thus the sole
fact that a program contains speech that some persons may find of-
fensive-but falls short of being obscene-is an insufficient reason to
ban the program from the airwaves altogether. Instead, the speech
may only require "channeling" the program away from an audience
consisting of unsupervised children.
Applying this standard to the facts at issue, the Court held that
although the Carlin monologue might be protected in another setting,
since it was broadcast in a setting easily accessible to children, 6' it
could be banned by the FCC. 62 The Court listed a number of variables
leading to this conclusion, including the time of day, the program con-
tent, the composition of the audience, and the differences between
radio, television, and closed-circuit transmissions. 63 The Court ac-
154. Id. at 743.
155. Id. at 743 n.18.
156. Id. at 739-40.
157. Id. at 742.
158. Id. at 745-46.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 745.
161. Id. at 750.
162. Id. at 750-51.
163. Id. at 750.
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cepted the FCC's nuisance rationale and, quoting Justice Sutherland,
noted that a "nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place-
like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."' 1 The Court held
that "when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the ex-
ercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig
is obscene.'
1 65
Pacifica extends first amendment protection to indecent speech
that is broadcast during times of the day when there is no reasonable
risk that children will be in the audience.'6 Until 1987, the FCC took
a limited approach to enforcing indecency prohibitions through its
staff rulings. 167 The test adopted by the FCC for indecency apparently
had been reduced to determining whether the material at issue amounted
to the broadcast of Carlin's seven filthy words prior to 10 p.m.168
The FCC's reassessment of indecency in three 1987 decisions dem-
onstrated a broadening' 69 of the agency's exercise of regulatory power
over indecency.
(2) Post-1987: Actionable Indecency Under the "Generic" Standard
Former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler's term during the Reagan
Administration heralded an era of deregulation, which included fewer
intrusions into broadcasters' editorial decisions. 70 Since 1987, how-
ever, FCC indecency regulation policy has become more stringent.1
7'
Three simultaneous FCC rulings issued in April 1987 reverted the
definition of indecency from Carlin's seven filthy words at issue in
Pacifica to the "generic" standard previously adopted by the FCC in
164. Id. (quoting Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 368 (1926)).
165. Id. at 751.
166. The Court reasoned that broadcasting, in addition to being a "pervasive" medium
capable of entering the privacy of one's home, is "uniquely accessible to children" and
therefore "amply justiflies] special treatment of indecent broadcasting." Id. at 749-50.
167. See Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C. Rec. 930, paras. 2-6 (1987) (summarizing the
status of FCC indecency rulings following the Supreme Court's decision in Pacifica).
168. Id. para. 4.
169. See infra notes 171-194.
170. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 13, at 344 ("For the eight years of the Reagan Presidency,
the rallying cry of the FCC was 'deregulation.'. . . The institution of a complex and highly
intrusive new indecency policy runs directly contrary to these goals."); see also Comment, The
FCC's Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: A Broadened Approach for Removing Immorality
From the Airwaves, 43 U. Man L. REv. 871, 873 (1989) (authored by Jay A. Gayoso)
("Ironically, the FCC's more intrusive, regulatory approach comes during a period when the
Commission is making significant strides in deregulating the broadcast industry and suggesting
that broadcast content should get heightened first amendment protection.").
171. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 13, at 344; see also Announcement of Policy Statement,
New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,386 (1987) [hereinafter FCC Policy
Statement] (announcing the FCC Public Notice regarding indecency released April 29, 1987).
its 1975 ruling. 72 The FCC gave notice of these rulings in a Policy
Statement issued to broadcast licensees. The FCC's public notice also
set forth new time restrictions for broadcasting indecent speech. 73
In November 1987, the FCC responded to petitions for clarifi-
cation and reconsideration filed by a consortium of broadcasters, trade
organizations, and public interest agencies and issued a Reconsider-
ation Order affirming the April rulings.174 The petitioning broadcasters
asserted that the standards resulting from the April 1987 rulings were
unconstitutionally "vague and overbroad"' 75 because they established
no clear lines between indecency and obscenity 76 and would chill
broadcasters' editorial freedoms. 77
The FCC acknowledged the dilemma it faces when making in-
decency determinations. It must be careful to balance the competing-
interests of broadcasters' right to free speech against its mandate to
regulate indecent radio programming. 78 Although the FCC empha-
sized the important governmental policy of "safeguarding children
from patently offensive descriptions or depictions of sexual or excre-
tory activities or organs," thus enabling parents to choose the material
their children will see or hear, it recognized that the first amendment
limits the extent to which it may regulate indecency. 17 9
Although one element of the FCC's generic indecency standard
was that the program must be "patently offensive," the FCC avoided
defining this term by saying that the meaning would be "construed
with reference to specific facts," as it was in the April rulings.8 0 This
172. See supra notes 9, 133-134 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra note 6.
173. FCC Policy Statement, supra note 171, at 16,386-87.
174. See In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C. Rec. 930, paras. I n.l, 28 (1987).
The petition included a Petition for Clarification, filed by the National Association of
Broadcasters; a Petition for Reconsideration, filed by broadcasters and public interest agencies
including Action for Children's Television, Association of Independent Television Stations,
Inc., Capital Cities-ABC, Inc., CBS Inc., Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.,
National Broadcasting Co., Inc., National Public Radio, The New York Times Co., People
for the American Way, Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc., Public Broadcasting Service, Radio-
Television News Directors Association, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, and comments filed by Morality in
Media, Inc. Id. para. 1 n.l.
175. Id. para. 7.
176. Id. Among broadcasters' recommended revisions to the FCC indecency standards was
a request that the agency "provide more precise guidance as to the elements pertinent to
whether material is 'patently offensive' and violates 'contemporary community standards."'
Id.
177. Id. para. 26.
178. Id. para. 10 ("We must always be mindful of the first amendment limitations on the
government's ability to regulate the content of speech.").
179. Id. para. 11.
180. Id. para. 14, 16. Emphasizing that an indecency determination will be made on a
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imposes a burden upon broadcasters to decide what is indecent, absent
any prospective rules, and to air programs at the risk of being sanc-
tioned if the FCC subsequently judges the program to be indecent.
1 8
1
Reviewing broadcasters' "editorial judgments" within the generic
standard, however, led to contradictory decisions by the FCC in the
April rulings. When discussing the KPFK-FM broadcast of "Jerker,"
a dramatic depiction of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
and its effects on the gay and lesbian community, the FCC said the
subject matter alone did not render the broadcast indecent; rather, the
show was indecent because the subject matter was presented in a
"patently offensive" manner.182 Nevertheless, the WYSP-FM broad-
cast of a morning talk show with Howard Stern was held indecent
because it involved "innuendo and double entendre" susceptible to
varying interpretations. 8 3 The FCC said the broadcast "dwelt on sex-
ual and excretory matters in a pandering and titillating fashion," and
therefore may have encouraged unsupervised children who tuned in
to continue listening. 84 The FCC defined "contemporary community
standards" as being those of the average broadcast viewer or lis-
tener. 85 Unlike the Supreme Court's obscenity test in Miller v. Cal-
ifornia, 86 which adopts a more narrow "local" standard as one of
the factors for determining whether a work is obscene, 87 the FCC
broadened the meaning of indecency to include material that would
be found offensive by a "standard for broadcasting generally."'8 8 Given
the wide ranging mores of listeners throughout the United States, how-
ever, the FCC's standard leaves broadcasters with the responsibility
of measuring possible indecency against an impossibly defined "av-
erage" listener. The FCC also rejected an approach that would find
case-by-case basis, the FCC added:
We cannot and will not attempt to provide petitioners with a comprehensive index
or Thesaurus of indecent words or pictoral depictions that will be considered patently
offensive. There is no way to construct a definitive list that would be both compre-
hensive and not over-inclusive in the abstract, without reference to specific context.
Id. para. 14.
181. See id. paras. 7, 14, 15. In their petitions the broadcasters had requested that the
FCC issue prospective rulings. Id. para. 7. See also Commission Announces Action on 95
Indecency Complaints, supra note 14; supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (responding
to listener complaints regarding allegedly indecent programming, FCC imposed sanctions).
182. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C. Rec. 930, para. 19 (1987).
183. Id. para. 20.
184. Id.
185. Id. para. 24.
186. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
187. The first prong of the Miller test examines "[w]hether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest .... " Id. at 24; see supra note 25.
188. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C. Rec. 930, para. 24.
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a work "per, se not indecent" if it has merit, because merit is only
one of the contextual factors that the FCC and broadcasters must con-
sider.'8 Because the issue of news broadcasts was not directly before
it, the FCC declined to rule whether it would exempt all news broad-
casts from indecency findings, noting that a finding would always de-
pend on context.'19
In addition to defining the nature of indecent speech, the FCC
discussed the times of day that would lead to actionable broadcast
indecency. The FCC extended the time period for actionable indecent
programming from 10 p.m. to midnight.' 91 The FCC determined that
it is reasonable to expect that midnight "is late enough to ensure that
the risk of children in the audience is minimized and to rely on parents
to exercise increased supervision over whatever children remain in the
viewing and listening audience."' 92 The FCC stated that even if a
broadcaster is "chilled" from airing a program that actually is not
indecent when there is a reasonable risk that children will be in the
audience (that is, before midnight), it is not an "inappropriate chill."
The FCC did not extend the time period per petitioner Morality in
Media's recommendation that it ban indecency entirely because a 24-
hour ban would "run afoul" of the constitutional mandate in Pa-
cifica.193 In Pacifica, noted the FCC, the Supreme Court interpreted
section 1464 to allow only "the imposition of reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions," not a content-based ban that would preclude
all access by interested adults. 194 Despite the breadth of its indecency
standard, therefore, the FCC recognized the Court's willingness to
extend some first amendment protection to indecent speech.
In 1988, broadcasters, trade organizations and public interest
groups petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit to review the FCC indecency enforcement stan-
dard espoused in the 1987 Reconsideration Order.95 In Action for
Children's Television v FCC (ACT 1), the court held that the FCC
must give broadcasters clear notice of reasonably determined times
during which indecency may be safely aired through a properly pro-
posed rulemaking procedure. 19 The court further rejected the FCC's
suggestion of replacing the post-midnight "safe harbor" period with
189. Id. para. 17.
190. Id. para. 16.
191. Id. para. 27.
192. Id.
193. Id. para. 12.
194. Id. But cf. infra note 206 and accompanying text (24-hour indecency ban passed by
the FCC in December 1988).
195. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
196. Id. at 1342-43.
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case-by-case channelling determinations because these case-by-case de-
terminations might have a chilling effect on broadcasters. 97
The appeals court recognized that the standard adopted by the
FCC in the 1987 Reconsideration Order used the same generic in-
decency definition approved by the Supreme Court in Pacifica;98 like
the FCC, the court said "serious merit" was a relevant though not
decisive factor for determining patent offensiveness. 99 The court re-
jected the FCC's expanded time period, however, because the statistics
upon which the FCC claimed to rely did not sufficiently demonstrate
that "children" would be in the audience until midnight. 200 Further-
more, the court noted that the FCC had failed to provide a rational
basis for its definition of "children.''2 Although the court reiterated
that "indecent but not obscene material qualifies for first amendment
protection, ' 202 the court failed to shed additional light on the defi-
nition of indecency.
(3) On the Hill: Senator Helms Steps In and the Indecency Ban Expands
to Twenty-Four Hours.
On July 26, 1988, Senator Helms introduced an amendment man-
dating that "[b]y January 31, 1989, the [FCC] shall promulgate re-
gulations in accordance with Section 1464 ... to enforce the provisions
[against broadcast indecency] ... on a 24 hour per day basis. '" 203 The
197. Id. at 1342.
198. Id. at 1338.
199. Id. at 1340.
200. Id. at 1341-42.
201. Id. The FCC defined "children" as those aged 12 to 17 years. Id. at 1341. The court
vacated and remanded the FCC's Pacifica and Regents of University of California rulings at
issue in the Reconsideration Order with instructions that the FCC reconsider the espoused
channeling times after a "full and fair hearing." Id. at 1341, 1344. Because the Infinity
broadcast occurred between 6 a.m. and 10 a.m., implicating the "parent-child concerns" of
indecency regulation, the court held that under the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision it was
compelled to affirm the FCC's Infinity ruling. Id. at 1341.
202. Id.
203. Helms Amendment I, supra note 10, at S9912-13. Dissatisfied with the status of
broadcast indecency following the April 1987 Reconsideration Order, Senator Helms wrote
then-FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick asking whether the FCC's current indecency standards set
forth in the 1987 Reconsideration Order meant that indecent material may be broadcast after
midnight. Id. at S9912. Receiving an affirmative answer from the FCC, Senator Helms
continued to investigate the issue, stating that despite the safe harbor time period, indecency
"comes directly into our ... living rooms and assaults the millions of Americans that still
find this filth repugnant." Id.
Subsequently, Senator Helms wrote the Heritage Foundation, a conservative lobbying group,
expressing his concern about the FCC standards announced in the Reconsideration Order, and
inquiring about the constitutionality of a complete indecency ban. Id. at S9913. The Heritage
Foundation replied that the Pacifica ruling did not provide a definitive status for indecency
and recommended that a strong policy argument could be made to support a total indecency
amendment was attached to an appropriations bill for funding federal
agencies, including the FCC.204 As noted earlier, the Senate adopted
the Helms amendment with little discussion, and the President signed
it into law on October 1, 1988.7
On December 28, 1988, the FCC promulgated the requisite reg-
ulation enforcing the indecency restrictions of section 1464 twenty-four
hours a day.20 Since that time, indecent programming surfaced as a
primary issue during the nominating hearing of Alfred C. Sikes as
FCC chairman in 1989.20" In the months following his appointment,
Chairman Sikes declared to Congressm and to industry groups that




(4) The FCC, the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Status of
Indecency
The FCC's 24-hour ban on broadcast indecency, promulgated
pursuant to Senator Helms's amendment, was challenged in the Court
ban. Id. In his response to Senator Helms, Bruce Fein, President of the Heritage Foundation,
suggested, "[i]n these circumstances, the strong Congressional custom is to enact a constitu-
tionally uncertain law if it is thought to promote sound public policy, and make the federal
judiciary the final arbiter regarding its validity." Id.
204. Id. at S9912-13.
205. Id.
206. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1988).
207. President Bush nominated Alfred Sikes on July 11, 1989. See 135 CONG. Rac. 5807
(daily ed. July 17, 1989). His nomination was confirmed by the Senate Commerce Committee
on August 1, 1989. 135 CONG. Rc. S9394 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989). The full Senate confirmed
Sikes's nomination on August 4, 1989. 135 CoNG. REc. S10,384 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989).
See Congress Asserts its Dominion Over FCC, BROADCAsniNG, Aug. 7, 1989, at 27 ('From
the tenor of the hearing it was ... clear that lawmakers wanted the FCC to assign priority
status to the regulation of indecent and violent programming."); FCC Nominees Hit With
Stern Warning, ELEcTmoc MEDIA, Aug. 7, 1989, at 3 (Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman of
the Senate Communications Committee, said he is "well aware of the filth and garbage which
American people are almost required to see .... What is happening to Americans, especially
young Americans, is criminal."); FCC, Senate Commerce Reports FCC Nominations Despite
Religious Groups' Pleas for Delay, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) § Regulation, Economics
and the Law (Aug. 2, 1989).
208. See Statement of Alfred C. Sikes, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives on Federal Communications Com-
mission Fiscal Year 1991 Appropriation Request, Mar. 12, 1990; Statement of Alfred C. Sikes,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, United States Senate on Federal Commu-
nications Commission Fiscal Year 1991 Appropriations Request, Feb. 21, 1990.
209. See, e.g., Alfred C. Sikes, Remarks Before the National Association of Broadcasters
Annual Convention (Apr. 3, 1990) (proposing broadcasters' "self-regulation over government
controls" in many areas, including indecency); Alfred C. Sikes, Remarks Before the Television
Association Convention (Jan. 5, 1990) (speaking about the FCC's action on pending indecency
cases, stating: "It remains my hope that the industry will, through a code, make a values
statement ... ."); see also FCC Chief Welcomes Participation of Nation's Religious Broad-
casters, Wash. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, at B5 (assuring religious broadcasters that children will
be adequately protected from adult programming and inviting religious broadcasters to scru-
tinize the FCC).
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC (ACT I1).210 The court stayed enforcement
of the ban pending judicial review and remanded the case to the FCC,
which accordingly issued a Notice of Inquiry "to build a factual record
and solicit public comment relevant to a judicial determination of a
total ban on broadcast indecency. ' 21 In an effort to uphold Congress'
intent in passing the Helms Amendment, the FCC fashioned its inquiry
to determine how to further the policy of protecting children from
indecent broadcasts.2 1 2 The FCC attempted specifically to solicit in-
formation regarding "children's 23 listening and viewing habits, par-
ticularly with respect to whether there is a reasonable risk that children
will be in the audience at all times of the day or night.
'21 4
The FCC was influenced by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,2 5 which sug-
gested that a total ban on indecent communications may be consti-
tutionally permissible if "data [can] be found demonstrating the
infeasibility of alternate means to provide... adequate protection of
minors. ' 21 6 The majority in Sable, however, extended full first amend-
ment protection to indecent speech.21 7 Moreover, it held that the gov-
ernment may only regulate protected speech to promote a "compelling"
governmental interest if it adopts the "least restrictive means" to ef-
fectuate that interest.21 8 Under this guidance, the FCC sought data
demonstrating that a 24-hour ban would pass this heightened judicial
scrutiny. 21 9 Broadcasters, industry groups, and public interest agencies
(Broadcasters) collectively introduced data that, they asserted, would
210. No. 88-1916 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1989) (unpublished opinion cited in 1990 Indecency
Prohibitions, supra note 4).
211. See Notice of Inquiry, paras. 1-3, 11, 14.
212. Id.
213. The FCC defined "children" as consisting of persons aged 17 years and under. Id.
para. 20.
214. Id. para. 21.
215. 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989). Although the Sable opinion specifically concerned obscene
and indecent telephone messages, the Court addressed the general issue of sexual expression
that is indecent but not obscene. Id. at 2836.
216. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 211, para. 13 (quoting Sable, 192 S. Ct. at 2840 (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
217. 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
218. Id.
219. The FCC's Notice requested statistics relating to
(1) children's access to the broadcast media as well as their actual viewing and
listening habits; (2) the feasibility of alternative means of restricting children's access
to broadcasts, including time channeling alone or in conjunction with parental
supervision, ratings or warning devices or alternative broadcast technologies; and (3)
the availability of indecent material for adults through non-broadcast means.
Notice of Inquiry, supra note 211, para. 17.
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fatally undermine justifying a complete ban on broadcast indecent
speech.m The Broadcasters argued that the Supreme Court's Pacifica
and Sable rulings extend first amendment protection to indecent
speech;221 that there is not legitimate governmental interest in pro-
tecting-adults from indecent material;m that a total ban on indecent
material under the FCC's indecency standard "encompasses a broad
and diverse range of material of potential social value";2 and that
total suppression of indecent, speech is not the least restrictive alter-
native for protecting children from the "supposed harm" caused by
indecent broadcasts.2 Finally, the Broadcasters asserted that the FCC's
indecency standard is unconstitutionally vaguem and that the FCC
improperly applies a national instead of a local standard to determine
whether material is indecent.
Despite the Broadcasters' contentions that a 24-hour ban is con-
stitutionally impermissible, the FCC's assessment of the response to
its Notice of Inquiry concluded that a total ban of indecent broadcast
material "is the most narrowly tailored means of protecting children
from indecent material." 227 To ensure that indecent programming re-
mains inaccessible to children, it determined that a station faced with
an indecency complaint should be required to demonstrate that "chil-
dren in fact are not in the broadcast audience for the entire market,
not just the particular station, at the time it aired the allegedly indecent
material. '"m This requirement, however, might unfairly prevent a sta-
220. Comments of Action for Children's Television, American Civil Liberties Union,
Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc., Capital Cities/ABC Inc., CBS, Inc., et
al., Before the Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Enforcement of
Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, MM Docket No. 89-494, Feb.
20, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter Broadcasters' Comments].
221. Id. at 4-5.
222. Id. at 5-6.
223. Id. at 6-7.
224. Id. at 18. Additionally, the Broadcasters criticized the FCC's assumption that "the
relevant question is whether there are substantial numbers of children in the overall broadcast
audience throughout the day," rather than whether there is a reasonable risk that the specific
audience affected by a potentially indecent program contains children. Id. at 26. As an
example, the Broadcasters cited statistics demonstrating that National Public Radio member
stations have "no measurable audience" of children during the hours of 6 a.m. to 10 a.m.
and 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. Id. at 26 & n.65. The Broadcasters further disagreed with the FCC's
view that parents do not have an opportunity to supervise their children "unless they are
actually watching or listening with the children or have specific knowledge of their children's
viewing or listening." Id. at 29 & n.79. Instead, the Broadcasters suggested that "[als long as
parents or other adults are with children, they have the opportunity for supervision." Id. at
31.
225. Id. at 35-40.
226. Id. at 40-44.
227. 1990 Indecency Prohibitions, supra note 4, para. 91.
228. Id. para. 90.
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tion with no measurable children's audience from airing a program
containing potentially indecent material if children are present in its
overall market. 229
The foregoing events demonstrate several problems surrounding
the current status of indecency regulation as it relates to broadcasters'
first amendment rights. First, in both Pacifica and Sable, the Supreme
Court held that speech that is indecent but not obscene is protected
by the first amendment. 30 Given this constitutional standard, the Court
further determined that the government may only regulate indecent
speech in order to effectuate an important governmental interest.23
While the Court recognized the interest of protecting children from
exposure to indecent material in both Pacifica and Sable, each decision
framed the mode of promoting this interest in a different manner. In
Pacifica, the Court upheld time, place, and manner restrictions that
would "channel" indecent broadcast materials to times of the day
when there is no reasonable risk that children will comprise the viewing
or listening audience. 2 2 Sable adopted a higher degree of scrutiny,
requiring the government to demonstrate that its regulation of in-
decency not only promotes a "compelling" governmental interest, but
also adopts the "least restrictive" means to do so. 231 A complete ban
on indecent speech goes beyond the channeling approach espoused in
Pacifica and unconstitutionally contradicts the Court's assertion that
indecent speech should not be banned from the air altogether.24 A
statute that bans indecency 24-hours a day is overbroad. Because it
leaves broadcasters without an alternative time to air programs con-
taining indecent material, the regulation prevents adults from ever
viewing or listening to protected speech, even during times of the day
or on particular programs that have no measurable children's audi-
ence. 235 Additionally, the 24-hour ban fails under the Sable standard. 236
Although one may agree that protecting unsupervised children's access
to indecent broadcasts is an important governmental interest, a total
ban is not the least restrictive means of protecting that interest. As
229. See id. paras. 47-48. For example, Pacifica Foundation submitted statistics demon-
strating that children between the ages of 12 and 17 years comprise a 0.2% share of the public
radio listening audience, and only 1.5% of children in this age group "tune[] into public radio
for 5 minutes during an average week." Id. para. 28 & n.62 (citing Pacifica Comments at 23-
25 and Attachment 4).
230. 1990 Indecency Prohibitions, supra note 4, para. 12; see also supra notes 158, 217.
231. See supra notes 161, 218 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
235. See 1990 Indecency Prohibition, supra note 4.
236. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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broadcasters have asserted,237 the channeling option would be a more
constitutionally permissible method of protecting children, particularly
if presented as a prospective FCC rule that established clear guidelines
for broadcasters to follow. Additional methods, such as pre-broadcast
warnings,28 rating codes,3 9 and broadcast technologies that assist pa-
rental supervision,20 would offer alternatives to a total ban. These
would allow parents, and not the government, to supervise their chil-
dren.
A statutory ban on indecency 24 hours a day therefore uncon-
stitutionally restricts protected speech from the airwaves. Although
enforcement of the ban has been stayed pending further review,24 it
nevertheless has been upheld by the FCC as the least restrictive means
of effectuating a compelling governmental interest.342 Both the 24-hour
ban and the FCC interpretation of the ban, therefore, should be struck
down as unconstitutional infringements of the first amendment.
A second problem with the current status of indecency regulation
concerns the operable definition of indecency. The "generic" stan-
dard,24 as originally defined in the FCC's 1975 Pacifica ruling,2 4 sub-
sequently, upheld by the Supreme Court in Pacifica,2 5 and most
recently adopted by the FCC in its 1990 Indecency Prohibitions de-
cision,24 remains vague and-overbroad. As broadcasters have contin-
uously asserted, although the standard requires that material be
"patently offensive," 2 7 neither the courts nor the FCC have clearly
defined this term. The FCC has merely asserted that a determination
will always depend on context.2" Furthermore, it has stated that while
the subject matter of a program alone may not render it indecent, it
will be considered as such if "presented in a manner that is patently
offensive." 249 Neither of these explanations offers clear guidance as
to what exactly constitutes offensiveness. Adding to this difficulty is
the requirement that the material's offensiveness be measured ac-
cording to "contemporary community standards."2 0 While this may
237. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
238. See 1990 Indecency Prohibitions, supra note 4, para. 69.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
244. Id.
245. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
246. 1990 Indecency Prohibitions, supra note 4.
247. See supra note 9.
248. See supra note 180 and accompanying, text.
249. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 9.
January 1991] CONDITIONED FUNDING
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
appear to describe the standard of a particular community listening
to a specific broadcast, the FCC has interpreted this factor to mean
a national standard for "broadcasters generally. " 25' As previously dis-
cussed, 2 2 this standard is broader than the local standard adopted by
the Supreme Court in the Miller obscenity test when determining
whether a work appeals to the "prurient interest.' '253 The Miller Court
recognized that uniform standards do not factor in differences among
communities. 2 4 Because a national standard would preclude adults in
communities that would not consider a program offensive from ever
hearing or seeing it, the standard fails as overbroad.
255
An additional problem with the generic indecency standard is its
failure to specifically address a program's literary, artistic, or social
value when determining whether the speech is patently offensive. Again,
the Miller obscenity test adopts a work's value in these contexts as
one of the three factors2 6 to consider when determining whether it is
obscene. Because the indecency standard is silent with regard to this
factor, it leaves broadcasters without clear guidance as to the extent
of the relevance of a program's literary, artistic, or social merit. Be-
cause the current standard could erroneously encompass, and there-
fore lead to the suppression of, fully protected speech that has serious
literary, artistic, or social value, the standard is unconstitutionally ov-
erbroad.
Based on the foregoing discussion, a statutory ban of broadcast
indecency 24-hours a day would have a chilling effect on fully pro-
tected speech and should be struck down if reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, because the operable definition of indecency re-
sults in a vague and overbroad method of regulation, it, too, should
fail under first amendment principles.
III. May Congress Constitutionally Condition the Receipt of
Federal Funding?
Even if the Supreme Court were to strike down the 24-hour ban
as an unconstitutional mode of indecency regulation, public broad-
251. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 186-189.
253. See supra notes 186-87.
254. 413 U.S. at 32-33 ("It is neither Constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment
as requiring that the people of Miami or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City. [citation omitted] ... People in different States
vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism
of conformity.").
255. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 25.
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casters still could be subject to indirect government regulation based
on their reliance on federally appropriated funds. As illustrated by
congressional action taken against the NEA in order to curb obscenity
in federally funded art, a similar situation could face public broad-
casters earmarked to receive federally appropriated funds. This Part
discusses the implications of a hypothetical situation in which Con-
gress attempts to indirectly regulate indecency in public broadcasting
programming by conditioning its allocation of funds to broadcasters
on their agreeing to refrain from airing indecent programs. It examines
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the Supreme Court's
decision in League of Women Voters v. FCC, in which the Court struck
down an editorializing ban directed at public broadcasting stations that
received CPB grants as an unconstitutional mode of restricting pro-
tected speech. This Part concludes that a legislative scheme that would
infringe public broadcasters' right to air protected speech in an indirect
manner would result in an unconstitutional condition.
A. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" states that the gov-
ernment may not grant a benefit on the condition that a beneficiary
surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold
that benefit altogether .- 7 Although the doctrine was established ini-
tially within the context of economic activities in Lochner v. New
York, 8 the Supreme Court eventually extended the doctrine to protect
257. See Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv.
1103, 1120 (1987); Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HALv. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (1989).
For general commentary on the doctrine, see Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HArv.
L. REv. 5 (1988); Rosenthal, supra; Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72
CAlmF. L. REv. 1044, 1053-54 (1984); Sullivan, supra; Wald, Government Benefits: A New
Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 247, 251-59 (1990); Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric
of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. REv. 977 (1986).
258. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Professor Sullivan notes that the Lochner Court "first fashioned
the doctrine" under the Court's "then-prevailing" adherence to substantive due process as a
means of invalidating economic welfare regulation. Sullivan, supra note 257, at 1416 & n.2
(citing L. TamE, A1AmcA Co NsrTrTToNAL LAw §§ 8-2 to 8-4, at 567-74 (2d ed. 1988)). A
line of early cases also utilized the doctrine in situations where foreign corporations wished to
do business in a particular state, e.g., Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Tafoya, 270
U.S. 426 (1926); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
Additionally, parties have raised unconstitutional conditions challenges within the context of
interstate commerce, e.g., Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Sere. Com'n,
341 U.S. 329 (1951); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937); Pullman Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 (1910).
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civil liberties. 259 Consequently, the right to free speech is protected
from impositions of unconstitutional conditions. 260 The unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine itself has not been applied uniformly;2' in
the context of government spending, the Supreme Court has tended
to examine cases individually in determining whether "coercive con-
ditions"-those altering a recipient's conduct-exist rather than es-
tablishing a broad doctrine of unconstitutional conditions .262
In determining whether an unconstitutional condition exists, the
Court has examined the nature of the governmental benefit and the
constitutional right involved. 263 It then has analyzed how and the ex-
tent to which the condition has infringed upon the recipient's right.
26
4
The types of benefits that implicate an unconstitutional conditions
analysis are "[t]hose that the government is permitted, but not com-
pelled to extend.' '265 Among the types of individual rights protected
by the doctrine are those that "depend on some sort of exercise of
autonomous choice by the rightholder. ' ' 266 Generally, an unconsti-
259. Sullivan, supra note 257, at 1416, 1433 ("[u]ntouched by the falling rubble as the
New Deal leveled and rebuilt the substantive priorities of constitutional liberty, the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions reemerged under the Warren Court to protect personal liberties
... as it had once protected the economic liberties of foreign corporations and private
truckers").
260. Id. at 1416; see, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking
down an editorializing ban by public broadcasting stations receiving federally appropriated
funds (see infra notes 284-307 and accompanying text)); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503,
506 n.2 (1969) (striking down a public school regulation prohibiting students from wearing
black armbands in opposition to the Vietnam War, the Court stated in dicta that the government
may not "impose and enforce any conditions that it chooses upon attendance at public
institutions of learning, however violative they may be of fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (Court struck down tax exemption statute
conditioned upon recipients' vow to suppress certain forms of speech (see infra notes 270-273
and accompanying text)). For a comprehensive analysis of unconstitutional conditions within
free speech rights of abortion clinics, see Comment, The Prohibition on Abortion Counseling
and Referral in Federally-Funded Family Planning Clinics, 77 CAUn. L. Rav. 1181 (1989)
(authored by Andrew McCarthy).
261. Sullivan, supra note 257, at 1416-17.
262. Rosenthal, supra note 257, at 1121.
263. Sullivan, supra 257, at 1421-26. Professor Sullivan labels this as the .'exchange'
between the conditioned benefit and the 'affected' constitutional right." Id. at 1422. Because
the imposition of a burden on a constitutional right would heighten a court's degree of
scrutiny, Professor Sullivan notes that the doctrine examines "how much government justifi-
cation is to be demanded" for the conditioned benefit rather than determining "whether that
demand has been met." Id. at 1422 n.22 An alternative view that focuses on the "allocation
of the benefit," however, receives "deferential review." Id. at 1422.
264. Id. at 1454 (noting that "government action that inhibits short of 'coercion' has long
been held ... to infringe constitutional rights"); id. at 1462 (discussing "the power of
germaneness" of the condition).
265. Id. at 1422.
266. Id. at 1426.
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tutional conditions analysis examines whether the constitutional in-
terests at stake amount to "preferred" rights, thereby compelling the
court to adopt a strict standard of scrutiny.26 A regulatory scheme
that would compel a recipient to alter her mode of behavior within
the context of a "constitutionally-prohibited choice" could generate
an unconstitutional conditions problem. 268
Because the first amendment right to free speech has been held
to be fundamental, it requires a heightened degree of governmental
justification to support its abridgment. 269 The Court has analyzed reg-
ulatory schemes that condition the benefit of federal funding upon the
recipients' surrendering of first amendment privileges under a height-
ened level of scrutiny. In Speiser v. Randall,270 for example, the Court
held that granting a tax exemption conditioned upon the taxpayers'
vow to suppress political speech placed an unconstitutional limit on
their first amendment right to free speech.
27
1
Although the condition in Speiser arguably was coercive because
it would have altered the recipients' conduct within the context of a
constitutionally protected right, a condition need not be "'inherently
coercive' for the court to find it unconstitutional. 272 Because "chill-
267. Id. at 1427. Profession Sullivan notes that while the doctrine does not "define the
content of constitutional liberties, rank their importance, or set the level of state justification
demanded for their infringement," it defines the government's method of "burden[ing] those
liberties, triggering a demand for especially strong justification by the state." Id. at 1419.
268. Id. at 1426-27 ("[s]uch schemes allow one to opt into the beneficiary class by choosing
one course of behavior over another"). In defining "autonomous choice," Professor Sullivan
distinguishes situations in which the government discriminates based on a person's "unalterable
characteristics such as race or sex" (not an unconstitutional conditions problem because there
is no advent of choice), from those that involve an "alterable characteristic normally within
the constitutionally protected discretion of the citizen," and therefore implicate "pressure on
autonomous choice." Id. at 1426.
269. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1984) ("expression
of editorial opinion on matters of public importance ... is entitled to the most exacting
degree of First Amendment protection"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) ('pure speech'.. . entitled to comprehensive protection
under the First Amendment").
270. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
271. Id. at 518. Speiser involved honorably discharged World War II veterans who
challenged a California tax statute requiring any person or organization applying for a tax
exemption to sign a statement pledging that it "does not advocate the overthrow of the
Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other
unlawful means nor advocate the support of a foreign government against the United States
in event of hostilities." Id. at 516 n.2.
272. Sullivan, supra note 257, at 1454 & n.162 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968)). Professor Sullivan notes that defining "coercion" within unconsti-
tutional conditions analysis is "riddled with problems." Id. at 1420. She acknowledges that
"[t]he question cannot be a narrow empirical one about causation: did the government make
a beneficiary do something?" Id. Instead, determining at what point a governmental benefit
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ing" protected speech poses a "burden" on the speaker, it also may
be an unconstitutional mode of infringement. 273 In Regan v. Taxation
With Representation,274 for example, the Court upheld a federal statute
that restricted political speech by denying federal subsidies in the form
of tax exemptions to nonprofit organizations engaged in lobbying.
Appellant Taxation With Representation (TWR), a nonprofit cor-
poration organized to promote the "public interest" in federal taxa-
tion, 75 claimed that conditioning its receipt of tax benefits on refraining
from lobbying276 posed an "unconstitutional condition" upon its first
amendment right to free speech.277 The majority reasoned that because
TWR was not denied funds to support its nonlobbying activities,2 78 the
statute did not deny TWR "any independent benefit on account of its
intention to lobby." 279 The Court distinguished Speiser, 0 in which the
state tax statute in question would have completely banned war veter-
ans' political speech, by noting that in TWR the federal government
merely had decided not to "subsidize" lobbying through tax deduc-
tions .281
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion recognized the argument
that the statute in question "denies a significant benefit to organizations
choosing to exercise their constitutional rights" to lobby.2 2 Because
TWR still could create a lobbying affiliate under the statute, however,
becomes coercive, and distinguishing "wrongful from permissive constraints on choice becomes
a peculiarly elusive task." Id. Coercion therefore is not the only mode by which the government
can "impermissibly pressure preferred liberties." Id.
273. Id. Professor Sullivan defines a resulting "chilling effect" on speech under the
doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth as a type of governmental "burden." Id. Similarly,
situations in which a speaker is "required to obtain a license" (citing City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2143 (1988)), "reveal his identity" (citing Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)), or "confine his speech to media that leave no litter on
the public square" (citing Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939)), have been held
to constitute burdened speech. Id. at 1454-66.
274. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
275. Id. at 541.
276. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1990) (exempting from taxation the receipt of contributions
by nonprofit corporations "no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ... and which does not participate
in, or intervene in ... any political campaign on behalf of (or opposition to) any candidate
for public office").
277. 461 U.S. at 545.
278. TWR was the successor to another organization of the same name that was organized
under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(4), which allows lobbying but does not provide
tax-exempt status. 461 U.S. at 543-44.
279. Id. at 545.
280. Spaser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
281. 461 U.S. at 545.
282. Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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he believed TWR's constitutional right to lobby remained protected. 283
B. Public Broadcasters' Editorial Ban Held Unconstitutional in FCC v.
League of Women Voters
The ability to separate protected speech activities that are federally
subsidized from those that are not was examined again in FCC v. League
of Women Voters.2 In League of Women Voters, a regulation con-
ditioning federal funds upon relinquishment of the right to free speech
was held unconstitutional. 5 The Court held that section 399 of the
Communications Act,2 which at that time prohibited editorializing by
noncommercial broadcasting stations that received grants from the
CPB,2 was not narrowly tailored to achieve state interests that would
justify abridgement of speech.m
In order to determine the extent of the constitutional right at issue,
the Court first examined the nature of public broadcasters' right'to free
speech. Given broadcasters' important journalistic role,2 as recognized
by the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, broadcasting the
discussion of public issues is one of their paramount rights. The Court
in League of Women Voters emphasized that "the expression of edi-
torial opinion ... lies at the heart of First Amendment protection"2 9'
because editorial speech "informs and arouses the public [while] crit-
icizing and caijoling those who hold government office in order to help
launch new solutions to the problems of the time."m'
Because section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act prohibited
editorializing by any noncommercial broadcasting station that received
283. Id. at 552-54.
284. 468 U.S. 364 (1984); see also Comment, supra note 260, at 1193-94 (discussing the
"Separate Affiliate Doctrine" within the context of TWR and League of Women Voters).
285. 468 U.S. at 402.
286. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1988).
287. The Communications Act was amended in 1988 to exclude "editorializing" language.
Pub. L. No. 100-626 (1988).
288. 468 U.S. at 398. The Court held that "even if some of the hazards at which § 399
was aimed are sufficiently substantial, the restriction is not crafted with sufficient precision to
remedy those dangers that may exist to justify the significant abridgement of speech worked
by the ... broad ban on editorializing." Id. at 399.
289. The Court in Red Lion Brdadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), noted that
broadcasters, as members of the press, are imposed with the journalistic duty of informing
the public within an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail."
Id. at 390 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
290. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
291. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984).
292. Id. at 382.
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funds through the CPB, the Court in League of Women Voters struck
the statute down as unconstitutional. 293 Because section 399 specifically
restricted the type of speech that the framers of the Constitution sought
to protect, the Court recognized the need to be "especially careful"
when balancing the asserted governmental interests in support of the
restriction and when determining how narrowly tailored the editorial
ban is crafted to effectuate such interests. 294 The Court thus used a
heightened degree of scrutiny. The Court noted that the public's right
to be fully informed on important public issues through public broad-
casting was not well served by the editorializing ban because it di-
minished, rather than increased, the ability to broadcast these
controversial issues. 295 Accordingly, the Court held that even if some
of the hazards at which section 399 was aimed were sufficiently sub-
stantial, completely banning editorial speech was not narrowly tailored
to justify this significant abridgement of public broadcasters' speech.
29
The Court rejected government arguments that the editorializing ban
was necessary to prevent public broadcasting stations from becoming
propaganda instruments of the federal government or special interest
groups or to prevent the public from assuming that editorials by public
broadcasting stations represent the official view of the government.
297
In reaching its conclusion, the Court pointed to the Public Broad-
casting Act's "insulation" from governmental influence through struc-
tural safeguards, 298 including long-term appropriations for the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, with "specified portions" of
funds that go directly to local stations. 2" Furthermore, because of the
large number of noncommercial stations throughout the United States,
the Court said it appeared likely that "editorial voices ... will prove
to be as distinctive, varied, and idiosyncratic as the various com-
munities they represent. ' ' 300 When examining the effect of the edi-
torializing ban, the Court distinguished section 399's proscription from
the one at issue in TWR. Unlike TWR, a nonprofit organization that
could retain funding by creating a separate affiliate to lobby, a public
broadcasting station is not able to segregate its editorializing activities
293. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1988), as amended by the Public Telecommunications Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-626, § 10, 102 Stat. 3211.
294. 468 U.S. at 383 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring)).
295. Id. at 399.
296. Id. at 398.
297. Id. at 384-95.
298. Id. at 388-89; see supra Part I.C.
299. Id. at 389-90.
300. Id. at 391.
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according to its funding sources. 301 Because noncommercial broad-
casters rely on various funding entities, including the federal govern-
ment,3m the Court reasoned that upholding section 399 would absolutely
bar editorializing by a noncommercial station even if it received only
one percent of its funding from the CPB.!. The Court conceded that
if Congress were to allow noncommercial broadcasters to establish
affiliate, privately financed organizations through an amended version
of section 399, "such a statutory mechanism would plainly be valid
under the reasoning of TWR. ' ' 304 In the absence of such a scheme,
however, the Court held that the TWR rule does not apply to section
399.305 Conditioning federal funds upon public broadcasting program
content to an extent that completely prohibited editorializing, there-
fore, was held unconstitutional because the interests the state sought
to advance were not substantial enough to outweigh the "important
journalistic freedoms which the First Amendment jealously pro-
tects.,, 307
Given the unconstitutionality of the editorializing ban, League of
Women Voters establishes that public broadcasters' right to engage
in editorial speech is fully protected under the first amendment and
the Court will use the heightened level of scrutiny when analyzing a
statute that results in the abridgment of this right.30 1
301. Id. at 400.
302. See supra Part I.B.
303. 468 U.S. at 399-400.
304. Id. at 400.
305. Id. at 401. In distinguishing League of Women Voters from TWR, the Court further
stated that:
Here, by contrast, the editorializing ban in § 399 directly suppresses not only political
endorsements but all editorial expression on matters of public importance; it applies
to independent, nongovernmental entities rather than to the Government's own
employees; and, it is not grounded in any prior governmental experience with less
restrictive means.
Id. at 401 n.27.
306. The government's arguments for upholding the editorializing ban centered upon two
principal concerns. First, the government asserted that it was "necessary ... to protect
noncommercial educational broadcasting stations from being coerced, as a result of federal
financing, into becoming vehicles for Government propagandizing or the objects of govern-
mental influence;" and furthermore, that it would "keep thefl stations from becoming
convenient targets for capture by private interest groups wishing to express their own partisan
viewpoints." Id. at 385.
307. Id. at 402; but cf. Rosenthal, supra note 257, at 1122 (suggesting that "[t]he majority
opinion [in League of Women Voters] seemed to treat the case as though it involved direct
regulation challenged on first amendment grounds and apparently gave no weight to the fact
that the prohibition was predicated upon the provision of federal funds").
308. The Court acknowledged that both Congress and the FCC may regulate the "content,
timing, or character of speech by noncommercial educational broadcasting stations," so long
as the regulation is narrowly tailored to justify substantial abridgement of free speech. 468
U.S. at 402.
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In contrast, Justice Rehnquist urged in dissent that Congress has
the right to withhold federal funds for editorializing because the ed-
itorializing ban was a rational exercise of the power granted to Con-
gress to condition the receipt of federal funding.3°9 The editorial speech
at issue, he asserted, is content-neutral. He suggested, therefore, that
government allocation of public funds requires only a rational relation
to Congress' purpose in providing federal funds, as opposed to the
strict scrutiny required by the majority. 10 In a separate dissent, Justice
Stevens asserted that the statute was sufficiently tailored because it did
not chill editorial opinions by individual commentators on a noncom-
mercial broadcasting program. Rather, the statute only prohibited the
station from broadcasting statements agreeing or disagreeing with in-
dividual commentators' opinions."1 The dissenting justices, therefore,
would have upheld the editorializing ban on public broadcasting sta-
tions that receive federal funds. Given the closeness of this decision
1 2
and the revised make-up of the Court since the time of League, the
dissenting Justices' sentiments signal the possibility of the current
Court's upholding future intervention of public broadcasters' right to
free speech.
313
Although League of Women Voters was decided in the context
of editorial speech, it appears that the broader question of protecting
public broadcasters' "journalistic freedoms" was the real issue at
stake.31 4 The Court stated that "the press, of which the broadcasting
industry is indisputably a part carries out a historic, dual responsibility
in our society of reporting information and of bringing critical judg-
ment to bear on public affairs."3 ' Furthermore, League of Women
Voters illustrates the Court's intolerance toward a regulatory scheme
that prohibits editorial speech by recipients of federal funds such as
public broadcasters. Given public broadcasters' important role in in-
forming the public "on matters of public importance, '316 the Court
was unwilling to uphold a restriction on this sort of speech that was
309. Id. at 403 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist added that in creating the
CPB, Congress did not leave "its creature ... free to roam at large in the broadcasting
world, but instead imposed certain restrictions ... on CPB's authorization to grant funds."
Id. at 404.
310. Id. at 407.
311. Id. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312. Notably, this was a closely divided (5-4) decision.
313. Justices Anthony Kennedy and David Souter have been appointed to the Supreme
Court since the League of Women Voters decision.
314. See 468 U.S. at 402.
315. Id. at 382.
316. Id. at 399.
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not crafted "with sufficient precision" to alleviate governmental con-
cerns.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions serves to safeguard government beneficiaries'
constitutional right to free speech from being subject to govern-
mentally imposed conditions. A legislative scheme that would con-
dition funds based on public broadcasters' refraining from indecent
programming therefore would result in an unconstitutional mode of
infringement. As the congressional activity surrounding the NEA il-
lustrates, this indirect mode of regulation is not impossible to imagine.
Furthermore, the problem with a statutory scheme that conditioned
funds on the absence of indecency, like the flaw in the 24-hour in-
decency ban, is the vagueness and overbreadth of the definition of
indecency. If public broadcasters were to erroneously air a program
that later was held to be indecent, they would be subject to sanctions
under the present system. A statute that would condition the future
receipt of federally appropriated funds has the danger of chilling non-
indecent, and fully protected, speech. This unconstitutional mode of
altering public broadcasters' programming not only would contravene
the Court's holding in League, but also would result in an uncon-
stitutional condition.
Conclusion
Given the above arguments, the 24-hour federal indecency ban
and the "generic" standard of indecency should be challenged as un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad. In their place, the FCC should
create well-defined guidelines for indecency through prospective rules
that would place broadcasters on more certain notice. These rules
should suggest a range of words and settings that may lead to a finding
of indecency, and should provide clear examples of contexts that could
constitute indecency. Furthermore, the possibility that a program may
contain indecent speech should not condition public broadcasters' re-
ceipt of federally appropriated funds. This could lead to an uncon-
stitutional chilling effect on important news and educational programs
that, in fact, contain protected speech.
For example, public broadcasters should be free to present pro-
grams in which distasteful or vulgar speech may not only be appro-
priate, but necessary and protected. Congress stated during the Public
Broadcasting Act hearings that noncommercial broadcasting programs
are meant to educate, not merely to entertain.31 7 Requiring an edu-
317. See supra Part I.A.(2).
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cational program addressing serious social- problems to tread ever so
lightly in its language for fear of causing the broadcaster to lose the
right to broadcast altogether, or to lose federal dollars, is unrealistic.
For example, segments on AIDS, teen pregnancy, domestic violence,
urban crime, and the national and international war on drugs or al-
coholism may take viewers and listeners to contexts with which they
are not familiar. Conversations taking place in these situations may
not always be delicate and may even require distasteful or vulgar speech.
Nevertheless, it would be unconstitutionally impermissible to bar such
educational programs from the air altogether if they contain a segment
deemed "indecent, ' 318 which, in fact, may be fully protected.
Likewise, live newscasts and documentaries are not meant to pro-
vide an edited version of the way things could have been said or may
have taken place. Instead, under journalistic ethics, the news media-
of which public broadcasters are a part-have the duty to represent
events as they occur. A report on gang warfare or international human
rights violations may trigger a sense of distaste in delicate viewers or
listeners. Yet, as the Supreme Court has continuously held, the first
amendment was designed to protect these important journalistic free-
doms. Even in nonviolent settings, reality may require that "indecent"
or "offensive" matter become part of the programming if a public
broadcaster is to retain any credibility. Portraits of artistic and his-
torical figures or dramatizations of provocative literary works may
contain one of Carlin's infamous "dirty words." But as the repetitive
use of these words during certain times of the day alone is no longer
a guide for actionable indecency, readings from the works of Chaucer
or James Joyce may be kept off the radio altogether with the resulting
"chill" created by a 24-hour indecency ban.319
Furthermore, given the possibility of federal funds being con-
ditioned on refraining from airing of indecent material, public broad-
casting stations should seek to expand alternative funding sources to
avoid reliance on federally appropriated funds. These sources include
state and local agencies that are sensitive both to local programming
needs and to public broadcasting's mission of presenting alternative
318. See, e.g., Comments of the Pacifica Foundation, the National Federation of Com-
munity Broadcasters, Alaska Public Radio Network, Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc.,
Pan American Center and Allen Ginsberg, before the Federal Communications Commission
In the Matter of Enforcement Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
MM Docket No. 39-494, Feb. 20, 1990 at 13-70 (examples of programs "having serious literary,
artistic, social, and cultural value" that are suppressed as a result of restraints on indecent
speech).
319. See supra notes 210-211 (discussing the D.C. Circuit's recognition of a possible chilling
effect from a total indecency ban in ACT 1).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
programming, community residents and businesses,3 public interest
groups, nonprofit organizations, and foundations. Obtaining such
funding would diffuse potential governmental influence and control
over program content.
As Congress stated during the Public Broadcasting Act hearings,
public broadcasting should fill the gap left by commercial broadcasting
and should take creative risks to serve diverse and underrepresented
audiences. To thwart the continuation of public radio and television's
ability to heed this challenge by conditioning federal funds on program
content would be a tragic compromise for the millions of listeners and
viewers who depend on this unique form of communication.
320. See, e.g., ACORN Channel: Public Television without Public Broadcasting Service,
San Fran. Bay Guardian, Oct. 11, 1989, at 14 (reporting on KCAH, a public television station
in Watsonville, Cal., which is the first to operate without CPB funds or PBS programming);
see also Radio Bilingue Gives a Voice to Valley Farm Workers, L.A. Times, Aug. 20, 1989,
at 3. This article profiles Hugo Morales, a Harvard Law School graduate who created "Radio
Bilingue," a non-profit FM radio station broadcast, engineered, and managed almost entirely
by current and former migrant farm workers. Morales began the Spanish-language public radio
station with wholly local donations.
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